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Abstract 
 
The focus of this thesis is on attentional biases for emotional faces within trait 
social anxiety. There are two central aims. Firstly, to provide a theoretical expansion 
of what is known about attentional biases in social anxiety, especially regarding the 
theorised bias-components of facilitated attention toward threat, delayed 
disengagement away from threat, and attentional avoidance of threat. The second aim 
is to provide an experimental expansion by exploring paradigms that are relatively 
novel to the field, by using a mixed-method approach across four studies.  
The first study presents adaptations of the attentional blink task. Between 
these tasks, processing stages and task-relevance of the emotional faces are 
manipulated. The second study investigates whether a child-version of the attentional 
blink task can be used to investigate attention bias in child social anxiety. Study three 
means to disentangle bias components by measuring eye-movements using a saccadic 
curvature paradigm and study four explores if anxiety-related sustained attention 
toward different emotions is reflected in neural activation with a steady-state visual 
evoked potential paradigm.  
Ultimately, the findings and the existing literature are brought together under 
three themes. The first two map onto the thesis aims. Under the theme of components 
of attention bias, mixed support for facilitated attention, delayed disengagement and 
attentional avoidance in social anxiety is offered. The second theme evaluates that, 
with suggested adjustments, the presented novel techniques have the potential to 
explore attention bias in social anxiety. The third theme stems from the findings and 
focuses on how task-relevance of emotion might moderate social anxiety-attention 
links.  
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Taken together, this thesis extends knowledge of differential information 
processing in social anxiety and reveals the potential benefits of using novel 
techniques. 
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1 
1 Attentional Bias in Social Anxiety: A Literature Review 
 
This first chapter provides an overview of the theory and the evidence relevant 
to the link between attentional bias and social anxiety. First, cognitive biases and 
anxiety in general will be discussed, before moving on to attentional biases and social 
anxiety more specifically. A summary of an influential model of attention processing 
will be provided to highlight how biases in attentional processing, such as facilitated 
attention toward threat, delayed disengagement away from threat, and attentional 
avoidance, might be underpinned by different components of attention. In conclusion, 
the strengths and limitations of experimental paradigms employed to study attentional 
biases in anxiety will be discussed. Overall, the aims of this chapter are to establish 
which aspects of attentional biases in social anxiety warrant further investigation; 
and which paradigms could best be employed to answer these remaining questions. 
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 Social anxiety 
Social anxiety is characterised by fear of situations in which an individual 
might be negatively evaluated by others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Symptoms include fear of negative evaluation, social avoidance, and physiological 
discomfort in social situations (Connor et al., 2000; de Vente, Majdandžić, Voncken, 
Beidel, & Bögels, 2013; La Greca & Stone, 1993). The Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders Fifth Edition (DSM-5) knows ten specific criteria of 
Social Anxiety Disorder. In summary, these deal with anxiety about social situations 
because of possible scrutiny by others and the fear of being negatively evaluated. 
Furthermore, social situations almost always provoke anxiety and are therefore often 
avoided, and this anxiety is disproportionate, persistent, distressing, and not explained 
by other medical conditions or mental disorders (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013).  
As opposed to the diagnostic criteria outlined in the DSM-V, some proposed 
that social anxiety lies on a spectrum as a dispositional trait (Schneier, Blanco, Antia, 
& Liebowitz, 2002; Stein, Ono, Tajima, & Muller, 2004). Schneier et al. (2002) 
argued that pathological categorisation relies on somewhat arbitrary criteria: 
thresholds are difficult to determine and prevalence depends strongly on how high this 
threshold is set. Furthermore, they provide evidence that some related subtypes such 
as shyness lie on the same social anxiety disorder spectrum. In similar fashion, Stein 
et al. (2004) hypothesised that social anxiety lies on various dimensions and proposed 
four different approaches, of which a spectrum of social fear and avoidance. Thus, 
regarding social anxiety as a spectrum rather than disorder-classification based on a 
set of boundaries is relevant for the work presented here. Individual differences in 
social anxiety can be regarded as a dispositional trait, and therefore throughout the 
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experiments presented in this thesis analogue samples of participants will be used, 
rather than those diagnosed with social anxiety disorder. 
Regardless of spectrum or classification, social anxiety causes interference 
with daily functioning and has an estimated prevalence of 5-7% in adolescence and 
adulthood, often with first onset during childhood (American Psychiatric Association, 
2013, Broeren, Muris, Diamantopoulou, & Baker, 2013). Anxiety of any type can 
raise concern, having negative effects on school/academic performance as well as 
social and emotional functioning (Broeren et al., 2013). Significant progress has been 
made in delineating the cognitive underpinnings of social anxiety. However, a number 
of important questions remain. 
 
 Cognitive biases and anxiety 
In recent years, research has focused on the role of cognition in anxiety 
(Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). Cognitive models suggest that anxiety stems from 
negatively biased information processing (Watts & Weems, 2006). The literature on 
these cognitive biases and anxiety provides evidence for several different biases that 
play a role in the development and maintenance of anxiety.  
Biases relating to anxiety have been investigated for a number of cognitive 
processes. For example, memory bias refers to incorrect recollection of past events, 
resulting in remembering events as more negative. Whilst there is some evidence of 
correlations between memory biases and anxiety (e.g. Watts & Weems, 2006), these 
associations are not consistently found (e.g. Harrison & Turpin, 2003) and overall the 
evidence is not convincing. Another type of bias that has been investigated in relation 
to anxiety is judgement bias, which involves the negative perception of one's own 
ability to cope with negative information (Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2012).  
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The most convincing findings for cognitive biases in anxiety come from 
research examining interpretation and attentional biases. The first of these, 
interpretation bias, seems to be particularly relevant to social anxiety (Miers, Blöte, de 
Rooij, Bokhorst, & Westenberg, 2013). Interpretation bias corresponds to the negative 
interpretation of ambiguous or neutral information and specifically refers to the 
tendency to negatively interpret ambiguous cues in social situations (Clark & Wells, 
1995; Miers, Blöte, Bögels, & Westenberg, 2008). In relation to social anxiety, there 
is a link between anxiety levels and more negative interpretations of ambiguous social 
events, as well as an overestimation of the likelihood of negative social outcomes 
(Beck, 1976). Interpretation bias is distinguishable from judgement bias in referring to 
negative interpretations of ambiguity situations/stimuli, whilst judgement bias is an 
overestimation of the emotional cost and probability of a negative event 
(Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2012). Previous research supports the view that socially 
anxious persons are more prone to interpretation bias (Mathews & Mackintosh, 2000). 
Child research has also indicated that a positive correlation exists between children’s 
social anxiety symptoms and negative interpretations for ambiguous events (Hadwin, 
Frost, French, & Richards, 1997; Vassilopoulos & Banerjee, 2012).  
Attention bias is the focus of the present thesis and refers to abnormalities in 
attentional processing of potential threats. There is substantial evidence that anxious 
adults exhibit biases in attention for threat-related stimuli (Bar-Haim, Lamy, 
Pergamin, Bakermans-Kranenburg, & van IJzendoorn, 2007), suggesting that the 
attentional system of anxious individuals is more sensitive to threat-related stimuli as 
compared with non-anxious individuals. These anxiety related attentional biases are 
found in child-populations as well (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Dudeney, Sharpe, & Hunt, 
2015; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006). The exact mechanisms that might underpin 
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attentional biases have been described in a number of models, which will be described 
below (see Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
 
 Mechanisms underpinning attention bias 
Schema theories describe that attention to information and interpretation and 
recollection thereof is guided by schemas, which are biased toward threat in anxious 
individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). It is proposed that threat-related material is 
favoured at all stages of cognitive processing, including early attentional processing. 
For example, Beck and Clark's (1997) cognitive model proposes that anxiety is 
characterised by biases in the initial registration of a threat stimulus, the activation of 
what is called the primal threat mode -a state of alert- as well as later elaboration of 
the threat and reflection on it. 
Other theories propose that attentional biases in anxiety occur only at specific 
stages of information processing. Anxious individuals may be prone to cognitive 
biases in early, automatic stages of processing (Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & 
Mathews, 1997. Williams et al.'s (1997) model suggests that attentional biases 
originate at the preconscious level of information processing. The threat value of 
incoming stimuli is assessed by an affective decision mechanism, which produces an 
initial decision; if the stimulus is perceived as highly threatening, a resource 
allocation mechanism is activated, allocating attentional resources to the threat. 
Contrary to the theoretical position that biases manifest at early, automatic 
stages of processing, other theories suggest that biases occur at later stages: in anxiety 
there could be too much inhibition in elaborating threatening stimuli, which is 
reflected in threat avoidance strategies (Mogg, Bradley, de Bono, & Painter, 1997). 
Further, Wells and Matthews' (1994) model also argue against the idea that attention 
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bias is automatic and explains it as a computational accident. This model emphasises 
the role of a top-down mechanism: attention bias occurs when stimuli are related to 
individual characteristics, such as knowledge and previous experience.  
The conflicting views regarding the stage of cognitive processing at which 
biases occur, have led to theories that attempt to explain biases in both early and late 
processing (see Cisler & Koster, 2010). An example of this is Mogg & Bradley's 
(1998) cognitive-motivational model, which understands attention to threat as a 
normal and adaptive mechanism, determined by two systems; an initial appraisal of 
the stimuli followed by a goal-engagement system that determines the allocation of 
processing resources.  
A slightly different model suggests that attentional bias is only predicted when 
threat has to compete with other stimuli or task-demands (Mathews & Mackintosh, 
1998). Input is automatically evaluated, with its output feeding into a distractor/threat 
representation system. A final influential example of a model that attempts to explain 
biases at different processing stages is the attentional control theory (Eysenck, 
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). This theory, which regards top-down as well as 
bottom-up processing, proposes that anxiety disrupts two executive functions of 
attentional control: inhibition of automatic responses and the ability to shift attention 
between tasks. 
Only few of these models appear to describe their relation to all components 
of attentional bias. Whereas they all describe the stage of facilitated attention towards 
threat or vigilance, only Beck and Clark's (1997) and Eysenck et al.'s (2007) models 
emphasise difficulties in disengaging attention from threat. Avoidance of threat is 
only accounted for by Williams et al. (1988). An extensive meta-analysis of these 
models as well as others failed to demonstrate clear support for one particular theory 
  
 
7 
over the other (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). The authors concluded that anxious individuals 
are likely to have a bias for preattentive detection to threat, as well as biases in later 
top-down processes. These findings led to a multistage model of attentional biases in 
anxiety (Bar-Haim et al., 2007) which proposes the following: 
(1) A preattentive threat evaluation system scans the environment. (2) Stimuli 
tagged as threat feeds into a resource allocation system. This triggers a physiological 
state of alert. Ongoing activity is interrupted and processing resources are allocated to 
the threat stimulus, leading to a conscious anxious state. This alert state feeds into (3) 
a guided threat evaluation system, which carries out a set of strategic processes. The 
threat context is assessed, compared with memory and held up against the availability 
of coping resources and mechanisms. (4) This evaluation then reaches the goal 
engagement system. If the potential threat is consciously evaluated as being low, 
current goals are pursued, the stimuli will be ignored and the alert state will be 
relaxed. However, if there is a high conscious threat evaluation, a high state of anxiety 
is likely to be maintained. 
Bar-Haim et al.'s (2007) model aptly explains how individual levels and types 
of anxiety could be characterised by biases in different stages of information 
processing. Anxious individuals may have a tendency to automatically evaluate the 
environment as more threatening; be more prone to allocate their resources to milder 
threat; may tend to consciously evaluate alert signals as more threatening, even 
despite context and memory indicating the opposite; and/or the overriding top-down 
mechanisms may have deficits, which explains how even conscious understanding of 
irrational anxiety is unable to override the anxious state. 
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 Components of attention bias  
Bar-Haim et al.'s (2007) proposed multi-stage model of attentional biases in 
anxiety, is favoured by Cisler and Koster’s (2010) review of mechanisms of 
attentional biases towards threat in anxiety. This review confirms the notion that 
empirical evidence suggests that there are three components of attentional bias: 
facilitated attention for threat, delayed disengagement from threat and attentional 
avoidance of threat.  
The facilitated attention to threat component of attention bias refers to the ease 
or speed of which attention is drawn to a threat stimulus (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
Anxious persons may be more alert to potential threat, which could be the cause of 
their attention bias toward threatening stimuli. Past studies found inconsistent results, 
however, and this facilitation seems to be considerably moderated by high threat 
intensity and short stimulus durations, as Cisler and Koster (2010) pointed out.  
Another component of attentional bias is delayed disengagement from threat, 
which refers to an impairment in the shifting of attention away from a threat stimulus 
to another stimulus (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Support that this component plays a 
significant role in anxiety has been confirmed in studies using spatial cueing tasks 
(e.g. Fox, Russo, Bowles, & Dutton, 2001; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & Houwer, 
2006; Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, Van Damme, & Wiersema, 2006) and visual 
search tasks (e.g. Byrne & Eysenck, 1995; Lipp & Waters, 2007). The dot-probe task, 
which some argue can be used to disentangle facilitated attention to threat and 
difficulty in disengagement (Salemink, van den Hout, & Kindt, 2007), has provided 
more evidence for difficulty in disengagement as a major component of attentional 
biases in anxiety (Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & De Houwer, 2006). 
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The third component of attentional bias is attentional avoidance (Cisler & 
Koster, 2010), which refers to the favourable allocation of attention to stimuli other 
than a present threat stimulus (Koster, Verschuere, Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005; 
Mogg, Bradley, Miles, & Dixon, 2004). Dot probe studies have demonstrated that 
anxious participants show attentional avoidance at long (1250 ms), but not at short 
(500 ms) presentation durations (e.g. Koster, Crombez, Verschuere, & Houwer, 2006; 
Koster et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 2004). Attentional avoidance has also been found 
looking at eye fixations of participants with spider phobia, after an initial phase of 
facilitated attention (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005).  
 
 Networks of attention 
In order to arrive at a better understanding of biases arising during different 
stages of attentional processing, it is useful to discuss different functions and 
networks of attention. Posner (2012) has offered an influential model, which 
hypothesises that attention is composed of three functions: alerting, orienting, and 
executive functions (Posner, 2012). Support for this model came from imaging 
studies, among others, which indicated three separate networks carrying out each of 
these components of attention (Fan, McCandliss, Fossella, Flombaum, & Posner, 
2005). 
Alerting is described as a state of higher sensitivity to incoming stimuli. Using 
warning signals prior to targets is an effective way to alter this state and results in 
shorter reaction times, as well as differences in physiological measurements such as 
heart rate and pupil dilation (Kahneman, 1973; Posner, 2012). The orienting network 
refers to shifting attention to sensory signals, such as a cue carrying information about 
a target; like its location. Whereas alerting relates to arousal -even when induced by 
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warning signals-, the orienting network relies on specific and informative bottom-up 
cues, which facilitate shifting of attention. Finally, the network of executive control of 
attention is studied by tasks that involved conflict, such as various versions of the 
Stroop paradigm. Executive control involves self-regulation and is needed in 
planning, decision making, inhibition and error detection among others. This could be 
regarded as a bottleneck; the orienting network can be directed by any stimulus, but 
control can cause interference and inhibit orienting. 
 
 Attentional biases in different stages of cognitive processing 
As it has been established that attention is composed of three functions 
(Posner, 2012), it is sensible to consider that attention biases could occur at each of 
these different stages of cognitive processing. The three components of attentional 
bias proposed by Cisler and Koster (2010), map well onto Posner’s functions of 
attention. Taking first the facilitated attention component of bias, this aligns with the 
raised level of arousal in Posner’s (2012) model, which prepares the individual to be 
ready for potential threat. In other words, their attention is facilitated towards that 
threat. Socially anxious individuals could have a higher bias toward threat, when their 
state of alertness to threat is higher than in non-anxious individuals, allowing for a 
quicker facilitation of attention toward potential threat stimuli. 
Orienting could play a role in delayed disengagement from threat. Anxiety 
may be related to difficulties in task-switching for example, when biases do not allow 
for orienting attention away, or disengaging from threat stimuli. It should be clarified 
that different networks may overlap with multiple components and vice versa. Biases 
in the disengagement component of attentional processing could also be related to 
poorer executive control for instance. As illustrated in a study using rapid serial visual 
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processing, poor executive control of attention related to difficulties in disengaging 
attention from emotional faces (Peers & Lawrence, 2009). 
Another analogy could be drawn between the executive control network and 
the third component of attentional bias: attentional avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
Attentional avoidance occurs when attention is favourably allocated away from a 
present threat stimulus (Koster et al., 2005; Mogg et al., 2004). Dot probe studies 
have demonstrated that anxious participants showed attentional avoidance at long 
(1250 ms), but not at short (500 ms) presentation durations (e.g. Koster, Crombez, 
Verschuere, & Houwer, 2006; Mogg et al., 2004). Attentional avoidance has also 
been found looking at eye fixations of participants with spider phobia, after an initial 
phase of facilitated attention (Pflugshaupt et al., 2005).  
 
 Evidence for cognitive biases in anxiety: overview of methods 
Previous research into attention bias and anxiety has involved several 
experimental paradigms, including visual search, emotional stroop, emotional spatial 
cueing, and dot-probe. These have provided initial evidence for attention bias in 
anxiety and some insights into the mechanisms and processes that underpin attention 
bias. A brief overview of each task and its strengths and limitations is given below.  
 
1.7.1 Visual search 
Detection paradigms have been used primarily to study hypervigilance in 
anxiety. In the visual search task, a target stimulus is presented alongside an array of 
other distractor stimuli. Shorter reaction times for threat-related stimuli can be 
regarded as a straight-forward measure of heightened vigilance towards threat (Bögels 
& Mansell, 2004). In another variant of the visual search task, the participant is 
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required to detect a non-threatening or neutral target stimulus in an array of 
threatening distractor stimuli. Slower response times here could reflect difficulties in 
disengaging attention from threat.  
An example of enhanced detection of negative social cues in social anxiety is 
a study that found that persons with social anxiety showed preferential processing of 
faces; detecting an angry face in a neutral crowd more rapidly than a happy face 
(Gilboa-Schechtman, Foa, & Amir, 1999; Perowne & Mansell, 2002; Veljaca & 
Rapee, 1998). Whereas these studies demonstrated possible evidence for biases in 
preattentive mechanisms, or vigilance, other studies using visual search failed to find 
any evidence of such biases in social anxiety (Esteves, 1999; Pozo, Carver, Weflens, 
& Scheier, 1991; Winton, Clark, & Edelmann, 1995). 
Whilst visual search paradigms suggest that social anxiety is associated with 
hypervigilance for social threat, they provide no insight into how attention biases are 
sustained over time.  Visual search is response driven: a trial is presented until the 
participant finds the relevant target, which fails to allow for controlled timing. Due to 
these task-demands, detection paradigms may be informative about facilitated 
attention and delayed disengagement, but they fail to investigate avoidance of threat. 
The tasks described below are examples of paradigms in which presentation timing is 
determined by the task rather than the participants’ performance, which allows for 
more accurate investigations into the time course of attentional biases. 
 
1.7.2 Emotional stroop 
Being an adaptation of the classic Stroop task (Stroop, 1935), the emotional 
Stroop involves manipulation of word valence rather than colour congruency. In a 
picture version, participants are instructed to name the colour of a schematic face, 
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which displays either an angry or a neutral expression. A threat-related bias is implied 
when participants are slower to respond to threatening stimuli (e.g. angry faces) than 
neutral stimuli (MacLeod, 1991), suggesting avoidance of threatening stimuli. 
Initially being a widely used tool to investigate attention bias in anxiety, the 
emotional stroop has later been subject to criticism (Bar-Haim et al., 2007); mostly 
with the argument that longer response latencies may result from late processes that 
are unrelated to attention. Both neutral and threat stimuli may be processed to the 
same degree, but a reaction time impairment for threat related stimuli could be a result 
of intensification of the negative affective state of anxious participants (MacLeod, 
Mathews, & Tata, 1986). Interference by threat stimuli in the emotional Stroop might 
also reflect effortful avoidance of processing threat cues rather than attentional 
capture by these cues (de Ruiter & Brosschot, 1994). 
 
1.7.3 Spatial Cueing 
The emotional spatial cueing paradigm was developed to study (biased) 
allocation of attention to emotionally valenced stimuli (Fox et al., 2001). In this 
paradigm, a target appears to the left or to the right of a fixation point. On the 
majority of trials (the valid-cue trials) a cue will appear briefly at the location the 
target will appear at. On the remainder of trials (the invalid-cue trials) the cue will 
appear at the opposite location. A validity effect can be measured by subtracting 
performance on valid-cue trials from performance on invalid-cue trials. The valence 
of the cue can be manipulated. For example, a neutral, happy, or angry face could be 
displayed as the cue. When validity effects are larger for threat-related cues than for 
neutral-cues, an attention bias is inferred. Furthermore, a valence-related modulation 
of performance on valid-cue trials indicates that the attentional bias occurs at the stage 
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of initial orienting of attention, whereas such modulation on invalid-cue trials would 
reflect a difficulty in disengaging attention from threat-stimuli (Bar-Haim et al., 
2007). In Fox et al. (2001), no evidence was found for an advantage for threat-related 
valid-cues, regardless of participants' anxiety levels; indicating that attentional biases 
did not occur at the stage of orienting. However, it took anxious participants longer to 
respond to targets after threat-related invalid-cues, suggesting difficulties in 
disengaging from threat.  
The spatial cuing paradigm overcomes the participant-controlled presentation 
times in visual search. However, there are other limitations. For example, only one 
stimulus is present at a time, meaning that there is no direct competition between 
threat-related and neutral stimuli to measure attentional bias with. It is also possible 
that findings from this paradigm cannot be generalised, due to being contingent on the 
cue stimuli being task-relevant (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). In other words, regardless of 
valence, a single sudden-onset cue will strongly attract attention. This means that 
spatial cueing may not aptly measure the orienting component of attention, which 
could potentially explain the lack of evidence for anxiety related attentional biases 
occurring at this stage. Paradigms using multiple stimuli simultaneously, with task 
irrelevant valenced cues, may therefore be useful; such as the dot-probe task. 
 
1.7.4 Dot-probe 
Arguably the most frequently used experimental paradigm in research on 
attention bias and anxiety is the dot-probe task (Bar-Haim et al., 2007), which was 
designed to overcome the limitations of the emotional Stroop. In this task, two stimuli 
(usually words or faces) appear simultaneously on a screen, followed by a probe in 
the location of one of the stimuli. Participants are asked to respond to the location of 
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the probe as fast as they can. In general, shorter response times to dots in the location 
preceded by a threat-related stimulus indicate attentional bias toward threat (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). Because participants are also required to respond to neutral 
stimuli, delayed response times cannot be explained by response bias or general 
arousal.  
Manipulating the stimulus onset asynchrony in dot-probe tasks allows for the 
investigation of biases across the time course of attention. One of the main difficulties 
with the dot-probe task is that performance differences, and therefore apparent biases, 
could result either from faster engagement with the threat stimulus or from difficulty 
disengaging from the threat stimulus (Posner & Petersen, 1990; Posner, 2012). 
Furthermore, attention biases in the dot-probe task are possibly accounted for by 
poorer attentional control (Frewen, Dozois, Joanisse, & Neufeld, 2008). In a cueing 
task, employed by Derryberry and Reed (2002), targets appearing on one side of the 
screen were likely to result in negative feedback (thus threatening) and targets on the 
other side of the screen usually yielded positive feedback. The preceding cue's 
direction was manipulated, as was its duration. Besides assessing anxiety levels, self-
reported attentional control was collected as well. Anxious participants revealed an 
early attention bias at 250 milliseconds. Only the anxious participants with low self-
reported attentional control also showed an attention bias at 500 milliseconds 
presentation duration. This suggests that anxious people with skilled attentional 
control may be able to voluntary limit the impact of threat on their attention at longer 
presentation times. 
Further difficulties with the dot-probe task include the fact that it is only able 
to provide a snapshot of attention and there is quite convincing evidence that stimulus 
presentation time affects the results, with a fairly consistent anxiety-related attention 
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bias found when stimuli are displayed for 500 milliseconds (Shechner et al., 2012), 
but not at different display durations. For example, evidence for an attention bias to 
threat on the dot-probe task is less consistent when stimuli are presented for longer 
than 1,000 milliseconds (Frewen et al., 2008). Therefore it seems safe to say that 
modifying the display times on dot-probe tasks as a means to study biases in Posner’s 
different stages of attention has provided important insights into attention biases in 
anxiety but the task has a number of limitations. 
 
1.7.5 What these paradigms say about social anxiety 
Compared with other anxiety disorders, social anxiety is a more recent topic of 
research (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). Most recent social anxiety studies examining 
attention bias used faces rather than words as stimuli, as it has been found that social 
anxiety-related bias is more sensitive to faces than to words (Pishyar, Harris, & 
Menzies, 2004). Of the paradigms presented above, most attention bias research into 
subclinical social anxiety and Social Anxiety Disorder (SAD) has used the dot-probe 
task. A recent systematic review looked at facial dot-probe tasks in relation to social 
anxiety (Bantin, Stevens, Gerlach, & Hermann, 2016). The authors found 10 studies 
suitable for their systematic review, which indicates that relatively little has been done 
so far in the field. These studies revealed that individuals with SAD and individuals 
high in social anxiety display vigilance toward threat stimuli, especially at short 
stimulus presentation times. However, avoidance of threat was not found. This 
provides initial evidence for the role of early attentional processes in social anxiety 
related biases. 
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 Exploring cognitive biases in social anxiety: suggested experimental 
paradigms 
Visual search, emotional stroop, spatial cueing, and dot-probe paradigms have 
yielded mixed results regarding attentional biases in anxiety generally and social 
anxiety more specifically. More recently researchers have begun to use novel methods 
and techniques which could potentially further reveal the spatial and/or temporal 
characteristics of preferential threat processing in anxiety. Promising measures and 
tasks include the attentional blink paradigm, as well as eye-tracking and neuro-
imaging measures such as electroencephalography (EEG). These are outlined below.  
 
1.8.1 Attentional blink paradigm 
The attentional blink reflects attentional capacity when two targets are 
presented shortly after one another in a rapid serial visual processing (RSVP) task 
(Ciesielski, Armstrong, Zald, & Olatunji, 2010; Raymond, Shapiro, & Arnell, 1992). 
Perceiving a first (T1) target results in an impairment of detecting the second (T2) 
target when it is presented only a few hundred milliseconds after T1. This effect is 
called the attentional blink (AB) and it is affected by the number of distractor stimuli 
presented between T1 and T2 (Lag) as well as the emotional salience of the target 
stimuli. The attentional blink is reduced when T2 is an emotional stimulus, whereas 
an emotional T1 results in a prolonged attentional blink (Schwabe et al., 2011) 
indicating that emotional information demand greater attentional resources. 
In order to investigate attentional bias in anxiety, Fox, Russo, and Georgiou 
(2005) used the attentional blink paradigm manipulating the emotional salience of a 
T2 face target. Their main finding was that low anxious persons showed a strong 
emotional blink when T2 was a face expressing happiness or fear. In contrast, high 
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anxious participants showed a significantly reduced attentional blink for fearful T2s. 
relative to low-anxious participants. Using a similar paradigm, de Jong and Martens 
(2007) failed to find an attentional blink for either happy or fearful faces in social 
anxiety. This discrepancy could be interpreted as attentional biases in social anxiety 
not conforming to those found in the anxiety more broadly (Fox et al., 2005).  
The inconsistent findings might also be a result of task characteristics 
themselves. Often, a blink is absent when targets are faces compared to pictures of 
objects as distractors (Landau & Bentin, 2008); or when face targets are presented 
among a stream of digits (Awh et al., 2004). Compared with neutral faces, Stein, 
Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel, and Schneider (2009) found a blink for fearful faces 
when the emotion had to be reported, but not when the gender of the face had to be 
reported or when the face was to be ignored. They proposed that the attentional blink 
depends on the attentional set of the observer and is modulated by task context. 
Consequently, a task needs to be developed with certain characteristics in order to 
assess modulations in the attentional blink effect to be accounted for by social anxiety 
rather than task properties and demands. 
 Taken together with the notion that emotional processing requires few 
attentional resources (Fox et al., 2005), the strengths of the attentional blink paradigm 
make it attractive for studying the temporal aspects of attentional biases in social 
anxiety more closely.   
 
1.8.2 Eye-tracking measures 
Gaze direction can be sampled by eye-tracking equipment. Therefore, whereas 
measures such as of reaction times and accuracy on behavioural tasks may provide a 
useful snapshot of attention, it is necessarily indirect. Eye-tracking technologies allow 
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for a direct and continuous measure of overt attentional selection. Investigations of 
attention bias using eye-tracking suggested that anxiety-related biases are not always 
only toward threat, but also away from threat in later stages of processing, through 
attentional disengagement or possibly attentional avoidance (Koster, Verschuere, 
Crombez, & Van Damme, 2005).  
Eye-tracking has been applied to a number of the paradigms described in this 
chapter to investigate anxiety-related facilitated attention and delayed disengagement. 
For example, a meta-analytic study investigating these mechanisms in visual search 
and free viewing suggested that anxiety appears to be related to vigilance toward 
threat in both free viewing and visual search tasks, but has only been found to be 
related to disengagement from threat on visual search tasks (Armstrong & Olatunji, 
2012). Dot-probe tasks have found evidence of hypervigilance or facilitated attention 
in anxiety; early orienting toward threat compared with neutral faces is found in 
anxious participants relative to controls (Bradley, Mogg, & Millar, 2000; Mogg, 
Millar, & Bradley, 2000).  
One difficulty with eyetracking as used in the previous work described is that 
participants were required to look at the emotional stimulus for attention to be 
inferred. Attention may also be covertly captured by emotional information in the 
environment. With saccade curvature paradigms the influence of salient or emotional 
task-irrelevant distractors on the saccade trajectory can be investigated (Schmidt, 
Belopolsky, & Theeuwes, 2012). Consequently, both initial vigilance toward and 
subsequent avoidance of emotionally relevant information in anxiety-related biases 
can be explored.   
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1.8.3 EEG 
Attentional mechanisms are reflected in the electroencephalography (EEG) 
signal (Luck & Kappenman, 2011). In anxiety, EEG studies have revealed specific 
patterns related to resting-state frequency bands (Putman, 2011) and bias-related 
Event Related Potentials (ERPs; Bar-Haim, Lamy, & Glickman, 2005; Helfinstein, 
White, Bar-Haim, & Fox, 2008; Mueller et al., 2009), with the ERP research 
suggesting that differential attentional processing in anxiety is pronounced in the 
facilitated attention component of attention bias.  
Another method to investigate emotional face processing in anxiety is through 
adaptation paradigms. In these paradigms, a stimulus is repeatedly presented. 
Increased repetition of the stimulus evokes a reduced neural response (Grill-Spector, 
Henson, & Martin, 2006). However, this reduction is found less for emotionally 
relevant information, such as threat-related emotional faces (Vuilleumier & Driver, 
2007). Nevertheless, since effect sizes in adaptation paradigms are typically small 
(Rossion & Boremanse, 2011), using these to investigate how emotional faces are 
differently processed in low-anxious and high-anxious individuals would require a 
large amount of trials and participants. 
Recently, a promising alternative to traditional adaptation paradigms has been 
proposed: the steady-state Visual Evoked Potential (ssVEP; Rossion, 2014). 
Repeatedly presenting images of faces at a fixed presentation-rate, evokes a strong 
neural response at the same firing-frequency as the presentation-rate. Much like 
adaptation studies, repetition of the same face evokes a reduced ssVEP compared with 
presenting different faces. As the signal-to-noise ratio of the ssVEP is large, this 
method may be more cost-and-time effective than adaptation paradigms to compare 
neural processing of emotionally relevant information between low-socially anxious 
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high-socially anxious individuals. Finally, this method has yet to be used as a way to 
examine attention bias is anxiety. 
 
 Conclusion 
The aim of this chapter was to review the existing evidence of attentional bias 
in social anxiety, to identify gaps in the literature, and to explore the potential of 
experimental paradigms that could investigate this further. Tasks like the visual 
search, emotional stroop, spatial cueing, and the dot-probe, confirm that attentional 
processes of threat-information act differently in high-anxious than in low-anxious 
individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). These biases may be driven by separate 
facilitated attention toward threat, difficulty in disengaging attention away from 
threat, and/or attentional avoidance of threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010).  
However, little is known about the role of these components in social anxiety 
specifically. Additionally, the frequently used paradigms may not prove sufficient for 
disentangling the role of these components in social-anxiety related attentional bias. 
Here, it is proposed that the attentional blink, saccadic curvature, and ssVEP 
paradigms could prove useful for investigating these components of social-anxiety 
related differential emotional processing further. Therefore in this thesis, these 
experimental paradigms will be utilised to examine attentional bias in association with 
self-reported social anxiety. The thesis will focus on two aims: 
1) To provide a theoretical expansion of what is known about 
attentional biases in social anxiety, especially regarding the 
theorised bias-components of facilitated attention toward threat, 
delayed disengagement away from threat, and attentional avoidance 
of threat.  
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2) To provide an experimental expansion by exploring paradigms 
which are relatively novel to the field, by using a mixed-method 
approach across a series of four studies.   
Firstly, in chapter two, an attentional blink paradigm using neutral and 
emotional stimuli as targets is presented. The hypothesised facilitated attention toward 
threat in social anxiety should lead to greater accuracy for emotional targets relative 
to low-socially anxious participants. In chapter three, an adaptation of this paradigm is 
presented to 11-year-olds, as so far, little is known about social-anxiety related 
attention bias in children. Chapter four employs a saccadic curvature paradigm, with 
emotional faces as task-irrelevant distractors. By recording whether eye-movements 
deviate toward or away from emotional distractors, accounts of respectively 
facilitated attention and attentional avoidance of threat in social anxiety can be tested. 
The final experimental chapter is chapter five, in which an ssVEP paradigm is utilised 
to examine whether high socially anxious participants remain more vigilant toward 
threat over time than low socially anxious participants, which would be demonstrated 
by a larger ssVEP response. Finally, the findings of these novel paradigms will be 
brought together and discussed in chapter six. 
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2 Facilitated Attention and Delayed Disengagement in 
Social Anxiety: the attentional Blink 
This chapter will discuss a series of behavioural experiments in order to 
investigate components of facilitated attention and difficulties with disengagement in 
social anxiety related attentional biases. The paradigm presented here is an 
adaptation of the attentional blink. In the attentional blink paradigm, one or two 
targets are presented within a rapidly presented series of stimuli. When the second 
target (T2) is presented in quick succession of the first target (T1), people often have 
difficulties detecting it. In the first experiment, T1 is an emotional face, whereas T2 is 
a non-social neutral stimulus, an animal. If those high in social anxiety have 
difficulties in disengaging attention from threatening stimuli, this would result in an 
amplification of the attentional blink. In the second experiment, T1 is the animal and 
T2 is the emotional face. If attentional biases in social anxiety involve facilitated 
attention toward threat, performance of high-socially anxious participants should 
show an attenuation of the attentional blink. As both of these experiments ask 
participants to make a 2-alternative forced choice, it requires a certain alertness to 
the stimuli. Experiment 3 investigates whether these mechanisms of facilitated 
attention are also present in a more implicit design. Taken together, the experiments 
described in this chapter aim to disentangle components of vigilance and 
disengagement in social anxiety related attentional biases. It was found that, when the 
environment needs to be scanned for emotional information, those high in social 
anxiety process information efficiently regardless of valence, whereas those low in 
social anxiety showed preferential processing for threatening information only. 
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 Background and rationale 
 
2.1.1 The Attentional Blink and emotional processing 
In the previous chapter, the potential of the Attentional Blink paradigm to 
investigate emotion related attentional biases in social anxiety was introduced. 
Specifically, the paradigm offers a promising approach to investigate components of 
facilitated attention toward threatening information and difficulty in disengaging 
attention away from threat in the temporal domain. The attentional blink will be 
summarised and elaborated in the current section. 
When a stream of distractor stimuli is presented with two target stimuli in the 
stream, and the first target (T1) is detected, the second target (T2) is often missed 
when it closely follows T1 (Ciesielski, et al., 2010; Raymond et al., 1992). This 
attentional blink depends on how many distractor stimuli are presented between T1 
and T2, but also on target salience. There is evidence to suggest that the attentional 
blink is reduced when T2 is an emotional stimulus, whereas an emotional T1 results 
in a prolonged attentional blink (Schwabe et al., 2011).  
 
2.1.2 Emotional T1: disengagement from threat 
Previous research suggests that attentional blink tasks using a negative 
emotional word as T1 and a neutral word at T2 results in a prolonged attentional blink 
(Schwabe et al. 2011), suggesting that attention is captured by threat. This attentional 
capture by negative information was illustrated in a study where T1 was a negative, 
neutral or scrambled scene and T2 was a rotated landscape (Most, Chun, Widders, & 
Zald, 2005). Participants were instructed to ignore all other stimuli except T2 and it 
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was found that negative images resulted in a prolonged attentional blink, whereas 
scrambled and neutral scenes had no effect.  
Interesting results have been reported with emotional faces as T1. Fearful 
faces resulted in a longer attentional blink than neutral faces, but only when the T1-
emotion had to be reported as well as a neutral T2 (Stein, Zwickel, Ritter, Kitzmantel 
& Schneider, 2009). When T1-gender rather than emotion had to be reported, this 
effect of fearful faces disappeared. Furthermore, when participants did not have to 
report the face-T1 but only the neutral T2, the attentional blink disappeared 
altogether. This indicated that task demands play a role in the effect of fearful faces 
on the attentional blink. In other words, performance on the attentional blink is 
affected by the participant’s attentional set. 
Another study explored the effect of an emotional T1-face on detection of 
subsequent letter targets, in which it was found that angry faces resulted in a 
prolonged attentional blink compared with neutral or happy faces (de Jong, Koster, 
Van Wees, & Martens, 2010). However, the authors failed to find a link with social 
anxiety. On the other hand, a similar study where T2 was an emotional face as well 
yielded no emotional-T1 effects on the subsequent attentional blink (de Jong & 
Martens, 2007). 
In conclusion, there is evidence for attentional capturing by an emotional T1 
in an attentional blink task. However, previous research has focussed on strong 
emotional expressions such as anger or fear. Links to social anxiety-related attention 
bias for more subtle threat, such as disgusted faces, remain unclear. An enhanced 
blink is predicted when overinvestment of attentional resources in stimulus processing 
(Olivers & Nieuwenhuis, 2006) may prevent a neutral T2 from being detected when 
attentional resources are still captured by an emotionally salient T1. This predicts an 
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enhanced blink when emotional information processing on T1 targets consumes 
additional capacity. If these attentional resources remain captured for a longer 
duration in high socially anxious participants relative to low socially anxious 
participants, then this prolonged blink would provide evidence that anxiety related 
attentional biases might be manifested in the component with disengagement from 
threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
  
2.1.3 Emotional T2: facilitated attention toward threat 
In addition to investigating the effect of an emotional T1 on the attentional 
blink, T2-valence could be manipulated in an alternative adaptation of the paradigm. 
An emotional T2 is expected to command greater attentional resources, which would 
result in an attenuated, or shortened, attentional blink (Yiend, 2010). One example 
from the literature is a study by Maratos, Mogg, and Bradley (2008) which found a 
reduced attentional blink when T2 was an angry rather than a neutral or positive 
schematic face. If a positive relation between social anxiety and a reduced emotional 
blink for an emotional T2 is found, it potentially provides evidence for the facilitated 
attention to threat component of attention bias (Cisler & Koster, 2010). This in turn 
could relate to a more vigilant state of the alert network, as defined by Posner (2012), 
known as hyper-vigilance in the anxiety literature (Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Eysenck, 
1992). 
Experiments using emotional faces as T2 have yielded mixed results. For 
example in one study, a strong attentional blink for participants low on general 
anxiety was found for happy or fearful T2-expressions, compared with a significantly 
reduced attentional blink for high anxious participants for fearful T2s (Fox, Russo, & 
Georgiou, 2005). In contrast, de Jong and Martens (2007) failed to find a social-
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anxiety related effect in the attentional blink for either happy or fearful faces at T2. 
Potentially, attentional biases in social anxiety are different from those found in the 
anxiety disorders more generally (Fox et al., 2005). Therefore, investigating the 
attentional blink for emotional T2 stimuli may provide further evidence toward the 
facilitated attention account of attention bias in social anxiety specifically. 
 
2.1.4 The experiments 
One study which investigated the impact of faces as T1 and T2 found that the 
attentional blink is reduced when an angry face followed a happy face, but not the 
other way around (De Jong & Martens, 2007).  This supports the assumption that 
attention is captured by threatening stimuli. In the experiments presented in this 
chapter disgusted rather than angry faces are used as potentially threatening stimuli 
for two main reasons. Firstly, in social anxiety disorder (SAD), the core concern is 
fear of negative evaluation from others (American Psychiatric Association, 2013). 
Socio-moral disgust is perhaps therefore at least as relevant to the concerns of socially 
anxious individuals as anger. Despite this, little research has examined attention bias 
to disgust in social anxiety. Second, there is evidence that an increased sensitivity to 
disgusted faces in social anxiety may exist along with that to angry faces. For 
example, when Montagne et al. (2006) presented neutral faces which morphed into 
emotional faces, SAD-patients were quicker to identify the displayed emotion when it 
was disgusted and angry, but not fearful, sad, happy or surprised, compared to healthy 
controls.  
For the experiments that follow, T1-valence will be either a disgusted or 
happy face and T2 will be neutral in experiment 1. Experiment 2 will manipulate a 
face-T2 after presentation of a neutral T1-stimulus. Both of these experiments require 
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participants to make a binary forced choice decision on T1 and T2 target 
identification. This will be compared to target identification on single-target trials, in 
which the respective T2 will act as the only target in a stream among distractors. 
Inconsistent findings from previous attentional blink paradigms with emotional faces 
in the anxiety literature might be a result of task characteristics (e.g.  Most et al., 
2005; Stein et al., 2009).  Therefore, experiment 3 will utilise a more implicit 
paradigm: instead of presenting participants with a 2-alternative forced choice on the 
emotion on the face when it was present in the stream, participants will be asked 
whether they saw a face in a stream in which an emotional T2-face was not always 
present.  These three experimental adaptations of the attentional blink paradigm, 
address the question of whether high levels in social anxiety are related to differential 
attentional capturing by happy and disgusted faces. 
 
 Experiment 1: Emotional T1 
The first experiment aims to investigate whether presenting an emotional 
target (T1) affects the magnitude of the attentional blink when the second target (T2) 
is a non-social neutral stimulus. Previous research which used emotional faces for 
both targets, suggested that neutral non-facial T2 stimuli provides further insight into 
the effect of an emotional face-T1 (de Jong, Koster, van Wees, & Martens, 2009). In 
this experiment, T1 was a face with disgusted or happy expression, whereas T2 was 
an animal. The hypothesis assumes that social anxiety is related to difficulties in 
disengaging attention away from potential threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010), and 
therefore predicts that participants high in social anxiety will show lower performance 
than those low in social anxiety on correct T2 identification when T1 was a disgusted 
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face. There will be no difference in performance between the group following a happy 
T1. 
2.2.1 Method 
Participants.  From the sample of 35 undergraduate Psychology students, who 
participated in return for course credit, two outliers were removed, as they performed 
well below chance levels. Consequently, N = 33 (29 females); age range = 18.3 – 43.5 
years; M (S.D.) = 20.6 (4.2). All participants reported normal or corrected-to-normal 
vision. 
Apparatus and materials. T1 stimuli consisted of three male and three female 
faces from the Radboud Faces Database (RaFD; Langner et al, 2010). Disgusted and 
happy expressions were selected for each identity. T2 stimuli were six animals 
(retrieved from pics4learning.org) photographed en profil, which were non-
threatening and not typically pet animals; a camel, elephant, fox, goat, kangaroo, and 
meerkat were selected. The head was cropped, a leftward looking and a rightward 
looking copy were made of each, and this target was superimposed over distractor 
stimuli. These distractor stimuli were scrambled neutral faces from the RaFD. All 
stimuli were in grayscale and luminosity was matched. Stimuli were presented at a 
size of 252 x 252 pixels on a black screen controlled by a standard desktop computer. 
Stimulus presentation was programmed using the Psychophysics toolbox-3 (Brainard, 
1997; Kleiner, Brainard, & Pelli, 2007) in Matlab. The edges of the distractor images 
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and the animal images were blurred with a Gaussian mask to improve target-distractor 
similarity.1 
SPIN. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al, 2000) comprised 17 
items, with Likert scales 0-4. The SPIN is a self-rated questionnaire assessing the 
spectrum of fear, avoidance and psychological symptoms that are associated with 
social anxiety, providing a good internal consistency (alpha = .87 - .94; Connor et al., 
2000; see Appendix A). 
BFNE-S. The Brief version of Fear of Negative Evaluation -Straightforwardly 
worded (BFNE-S; Collins, Westra, Dozois, & Stewart, 2005; Rodebaugh et al., 2011; 
see Appendix B) is a self-report measure which assesses fear of negative evaluation, a 
characteristic feature of social anxiety disorders (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997). The 
questionnaire consists of 8 items rated on a 5-point Likert scale. Its internal 
consistency has shown to be high (alpha = .90, Collins et al, 2005). 
Procedure. Participants sat in individual testing rooms at a distance of 
approximately 90cm from the screen.  The experiment commenced after gaining 
participants’ informed consent.  The experiment comprised two tasks: a single-target 
task (T2 only) and a dual-target task (T1 and T2).  Each trial started with a fixation 
cross with 1000ms duration.  This was followed by a stream of 17 stimuli in total, 
displayed for approximately 67ms each (4 screen refreshes). Dual-target trials 
commenced with the presentation of 2, 4, or 6 distractor stimuli followed by the 
emotional face (T1). After T1 1, 4, or 7 distractor items appeared (lag-1, lag-4 and 
                                                
 
1 Pilot studies revealed that without masks, T2 detection was nearing 100%. T1 was presented 
without masks to increase its detection likelihood and consequently increase the number of 
trials suitable for analysis (T1-correct). 
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lag-7 at 67, 268 and 469 ms respectively), followed by the animal (T2). Finally, 
distractor stimuli were presented until the total of 17 stimuli was presented. 
Responses were self-paced and the next trial started after responses were gained. T1 
position, lag, and target stimuli were presented with equal probability. Single-target 
trials followed the same presentation principles, but T1 was replaced by another 
distractor stimulus. See Figure 1 for the trial procedure. 
 
Figure 1. Example of a dual-target trial with T2 presented at lag 4. In single-target 
trials, a distractor was presented instead of T1. Participants were instructed to identify 
the emotion of the face and the direction in which the animal was looking using a 
2AFC response after each trial. 
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After each single-target task trial, participants made a two-alternative forced 
choice response whether the animal was facing left or right. After each trial in the 
dual-target condition, this response dialog was preceded by the question whether the 
face was happy or disgusted. Responses were collected with a mouse. 
Each task was presented in two blocks of 72 trials, thus the total experiment 
consisted of 288 trials across four blocks. Task order (Single-target block, dual-target 
block, single-target block, dual-target block; or dual-target block, single-target block, 
dual-target block, single-target block) was counter-balanced between participants. 
Between each block, there was a self-paced break. 
Before the experiment, participants received instructions about the two tasks 
and practiced two trials for each task, which contained stimuli that were not used in 
the experiment itself. After the experiment, they completed the questionnaires and 
were debriefed. 
Analysis. For single-target trials average correct target identification per 
participant was calculated in percentages. Mean target (animal) detection in the 
single-target trials was 94.8% (S.D. = 4.87); approximately 7 incorrect trials. For dual 
target trials, average correct T2-identification was calculated for trials on which 
participants correctly identified T1 (M = 96.4% across participants, S.D. = 3.18, 
approximately 5 incorrect trials).  
Suggested cut-off scores for the SPIN and BFNE-S were used to bin 
participants into low and high social-anxiety groups. For the SPIN, the suggested cut-
off is 19 (Connor et al., 2000). Mean SPIN-score in the current sample was 20.2, S.D. 
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= 11.3.2 Using the cut-off score, 18 participants (54.5%) were classified as low-
socially anxious and 15 (45.5%) were high-socially anxious. For the BFNE-S, a cut 
off score of 28 was used (Carleton, Collimore, McCabe, & Antony, 2011). Mean 
BFNE-S score in the current sample was 24.4, S.D. = 8.51, resulting into 22 
participants (66.7%) in the low-scoring group and 11 (33.3%) in the high fear of 
negative evaluation group. Both of these questionnaires were subjected to individual 
ANOVAs. 
Individual ANOVAs were conducted for each set of high/low groups as 
defined by the SPIN and BFNE respectively. The two main analyses of interest were 
mixed ANOVAs on T2 performance with SPIN group (Between-Subjects; low, high) 
× Emotion (Repeated Measures; disgust, happy) × Lag (Repeated Measures; lag-1, 
lag-4, lag-7) and BFNE-S group (Between-Subjects; low, high) × Emotion (Repeated 
Measures; disgust, happy) × Lag (Repeated Measures; lag-1, lag-4, lag-7); both 2 × 2 
× 3.  In addition, some exploratory analyses were conducted as detailed below. 
 
2.2.2 Results 
The data was negatively skewed due to a ceiling effect in target-detection 
performance. Nonetheless, the exploration of descriptive statistics suggested that 
participants had more difficulty in T2-detection after correct T1-identification at lag-1 
than at lag-4 and lag-7. Greenhouse-Geisser degrees of freedom are reported where 
appropriate. 
                                                
 
2 One participant missed one item in the SPIN as well as in the BFNE-S. These missing 
values were substituted with the average item-score on each questionnaire prior to calculating 
this participant’s totals. 
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As expected, mean single-target detection was neither different between the 
low-SPIN and high-SPIN group; t(31) = 1.32, p = .20; nor between the low-BFNE-S 
and high-BFNE-S group; t(31) = 0.14, p = .89. For dual-target trials, both ANOVAs 
revealed a main effect of lag (SPIN ANOVA (lag effect): F(1.46, 45.2) = 31.2, p < 
.001; ηp2 = .502; BFNE-S ANOVA (lag effect): F(1.47, 45.5) = 27.5, p < .001; ηp2 = 
.470). Paired samples t-test revealed that T2-detection at lag-1 (M = 83.3%, S.D. = 
9.75) was poorer than at lag-4 (M = 93.5%, S.D. = 5.89); t(32) = 5.90, p < .001. In 
addition, detection at lag-1was poorer than at lag-7 (M = 94.3%, S.D. = 5.89); t(32) = 
6.26, p < .001. The difference between lag-4 and lag-7 was not significant. Only T2-
detection at lag-1 differed significantly from detection in single-target trials; t(32) = 
7.45, p < .001. No main effects of emotions or social anxiety were found, nor was 
there an interaction effect between any of the variables; see Figure 2. 
As a pop-out effect for T1 (face) was deliberately created, T1-detection 
performance in dual-target trials was high (M = 96.4%, S.D. = 3.18). However, since 
the attentional blink is thought to be affected by T1, several exploratory analyses on 
T1 were carried out. A SPIN × T1-emotion × Lag ANOVA yielded a main effect of 
emotion on correct T1 identification when T2 was correctly identified; F(1, 31) = 
12.4, p = .001, ηp2 = .285. Mean accuracy for happy faces was poorer (94.7%, SE = 
1.0) than for disgusted faces (98.2%, SE = 0.3). This was not moderated by SPIN 
group; SPIN group × Emotion interaction F(1,31) = 0.646, p = .43 , ηp2 = .020. 
Similar results were found regardless of whether T2 was correct. A SPIN × T1-
emotion × Lag ANOVA showed only an effect of emotion in the same direction. 
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Figure 2. T2 accuracy when T1 was correct in experiment 1, where T1-valence was 
manipulated (face) and T2 was neutral (animal). The horizontal dotted line reflects 
accuracy on single-target trials (animal). An attentional blink was present: accuracy at 
lag-1 was lower than at lag-4, at lag-7, and for single-target trials. Error bars represent 
+/- 1 within-subjects standard error.3 
 
Similarly, for T2-correct dual-target trials, a BFNE-S group × T1-emotion × 
Lag ANOVA yielded a main a main effect of emotion; F(1, 32) = 8.45, p  = .007, ηp2 
= .214; as well as a main effect of fear of negative evaluation; F(1, 31) = 4.73, p = 
.045, ηp2 = .124. Participants below the BFNE-S cut-off performed better on 
disgusted faces (M = 98.1%, S.D. = 1.69) compared to happy faces (M = 93.1%, S.D. 
= 5.92); t(21) = 3.99, p = .002. There was no difference in performance on disgusted 
and happy faces for participants above the cut-off, see Figure 3. However, it should be 
                                                
 
3 For future reference, figures in this thesis are displayed with within-subjects standard errors 
(Franz & Loftus, 2012; Loftus & Masson, 1994). 
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noted that only 11 participants fell into this group. This analysis also revealed  
marginally significant BFNE-S group × T1-emotion interaction; F(1, 31) = 12.4, p = 
.052, ηp2 = .116.  
 
Figure 3. Mean T1 (face) detection when T2 (animal) was correct (dual target trials) 
for the low and high fear of negative evaluation groups. in percentages. Error bars = 
+/- 1 within-subject SE.  
 
2.2.3 Discussion 
Investigating the attentional blink for emotional T1s and neutral T2s allowed 
an exploration of difficulties in disengaging from threatening information in social 
anxiety. It was hypothesised that if social anxiety is related to difficulties in 
disengaging attention from potential threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010), those participants 
high in social anxiety would show poorer performance on T2 identification when T1 
was a disgusted face than those low in social anxiety. The results presented above, 
suggest that that is not the case. A short attentional blink was found (at lag-1 only), 
but there were no social anxiety related effects on T2 performance.  
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However, exploratory analyses showed that those low in social anxiety, 
specifically those with low fear of negative evaluation, had more difficulty correctly 
identifying happy T1 faces compared with their performance on disgusted faces and 
compared with those high in fear of negative evaluation. This result should be 
considered with caution given that the effect was not replicated with SPIN score and 
was not anticipated. 
 
 Experiment 2: Emotional T2 
Whereas the previous experiment, with an emotional T1 and neutral T2, 
investigated difficulty with disengaging attention away from emotional information, 
the experiment described in the current section explores facilitated attention toward 
threat in social anxiety using the same paradigm but with the targets switched; here 
T1 is an animal, and T2 is an emotional face. It is hypothesised that socially relevant 
information “breaks through” the attentional blink more for socially anxious 
individuals than for those lower in social anxiety. In other words, even when 
attentional processes are dedicated toward other resources, orienting attention toward 
emotional stimuli will be facilitated for those participants with higher levels of social 
anxiety as measures using the SPIN and BFNE-S. 
 
2.3.1 Method 
This study comprised a new sample of 35 Undergraduate Psychology students 
(28 female). Mean age was 20.9 years (S.D. = 5.17; range = 17.9 – 48.0). Except for 
the target order, with T1 being the animal and T2 the emotional face, this experiment 
followed the same apparatus, materials and procedure as experiment 1.  
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2.3.2 Results 
Mean accuracy on single-target (face) trials was 98.8% (S.D. = 1.49). For 
dual-target trials, overall mean T1 (animal) correct was 89.9% (S.D. = 13.3) and T2 
(face) correct was 97.0% (S.D. = 2.32), indicating a negatively skewed distribution 
driven by a ceiling effect. 
Mean score for the SPIN questionnaire was 21.9 (S.D. = 9.62; Cronbach’s 
alpha for internal consistency = .86). Using the cut-off score of 19, 20 participants 
(57%) were in the high-socially anxious group. 
Analyses were carried out on T2 (face) identification when T1 (animal) was 
correct (Figure 4). A SPIN group × T2-Emotion × Lag ANOVA yielded a three-way 
interaction effect; F(2, 66) = 5.08,  p = .009; ηp2 = .133. Subsequent analyses for the 
high and low social anxiety groups separately showed that, for the High-Social 
Anxiety group only a main effect for Lag was found, p = .007; mainly between Lag-1 
and Lag-7 (p = .040, Lag-1 – Lag-4 p = .06, Lag-4 – Lag-7 n.s.). However, for the 
Low-Socially Anxious group, a T2-Emotion × Lag two-way interaction effect was 
found; p = .001. Examining the effect of lag for each emotion separately within the 
low socially anxious group showed no effect of Lag for disgusted faces, whilst for 
happy faces all three Lags yielded different accuracy, with improved performance 
over increases in lag (largest p = .002). Finally, comparing performance on happy and 
disgusted faces at each lag (for the low socially anxious group only), a significant 
difference was only found at Lag-1; low-Socially Anxious participants had poorer 
performance for happy faces compared with disgusted faces; t(14) = 3.58, p = .006. 
All p-values are Bonferroni-corrected.  
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Figure 4. T2 accuracy when T1 was correct in experiment 2, where T1 was neutral 
(animal)  and T2-valence was manipulated (face) for both social anxiety groups 
(SPIN). The horizontal dotted line reflects accuracy on single-target trials (animal). At 
lag one, accuracy of happy face detection in the low-social anxiety group was 
significantly lower than in the high anxiety groups, as well as accuracy on disgusted 
faces in both groups. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard error. 
 
In order to further explore this T2-emotion effect at Lag-1 a between-groups t-
test indicated that performance on happy faces was significantly poorer in the low 
social anxiety group than the high social anxiety group (t(33) = 2.08, p = .045) but no 
difference was found in performance on disgusted faces (t(33) = 0.83, p = .414). 
Further, a correlation between SPIN scores and accuracy difference for each emotion 
(disgusted-happy) at lag-1 was found; r =.39, p = .021 indicating that lower social 
anxiety is associated with relatively poor performance on happy trials.  
Finally, accuracy for each emotion between dual-target trials and single-target 
trials was compared for each social-anxiety group using paired-samples t-tests, which 
revealed the following. In the low-social anxiety group, only accuracy for happy faces 
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at lag-1 in dual target trials was worse than accuracy for happy faces in dual-target 
trials; t(14) = 5.03, p < .006, adjusted for multiple comparisons. There was no 
statistical difference in the low-social anxiety group between accuracy for happy faces 
in single target trials and accuracy for happy faces in dual-target trials at lag-4 or lag-
7 and similarly not between accuracy for disgusted faces in single target-trials and 
those at lag-1, lag-3, or lag-7 in dual target trials. For the high social anxiety group, no 
differences were found for accuracy for happy or disgusted faces in single-target trials 
compared with any of the lags in dual-target trials. 
Mean score on the BFNE-S in this sample was 22.7 (S.D. = 7.20; Cronbach’s 
alpha for internal consistency = .90) with a normal distribution. Using the same cut-
off score of 28 and higher, only 9 participants 25.7% were classified as high-socially 
anxious. Nonetheless, the results, though not always significant, appeared to be in the 
same direction as the above results for SPIN score4, see Figure 5. For example, a 
significant main effect for Lag was found; F(1.41, 48.2) = 13.8, p < .001, ηp2 = .295. 
The BFNE-S group × Emotion × Lag three-way interaction effect was only 
marginally significant; F(1.46, 48.2) = 3.42, p = .055, ηp2 = .094. This effect appeared 
to be underlined by a trending Emotion × Lag interaction; F(1.41, 46.7) = 2.89, p = 
.082, ηp2 = .081, as well as by the Lag main effect reported above.5 
                                                
 
4 The correlation between SPIN and BFNE-S was r = .61, p < .001. 
5 In the context of the BFNE-S results largely following the patterns found in the SPIN 
analyses throughout the current work, additional analyses from this questionnaire will be 
summarised in footnotes from this point. Low BFNE-S group: main effect Lag (p < .001); 
trend Emotion (p = .068). Interaction Emotion X Lag (p < .001) - poorer detection of happy 
faces (95.9%) than disgusted faces (97.3%; t(25) = 3.25, p = .003). High BFNE-S group: no 
significant effects. Numerically, the results in the high BFNE-S group appears to reflect the 
findings from the high SPIN-group, but this failed to reach significance, which can most 
likely be attributed to the small number of participants in high BFNE-S group.  
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Figure 5. T2 accuracy when T1 was correct in experiment 2, where T1 was neutral 
(animal) and T2-valence was manipulated (face) for both Fear of Negative Evaluation 
groups (BFNE-S). The horizontal dotted line reflects accuracy on single-target trials 
(animal). At lag one, accuracy of happy face detection in the low-social anxiety group 
was significantly lower than in the high anxiety groups, as well as accuracy on 
disgusted faces in both groups, but this interpretation is based on only a marginally 
significant three-way interaction. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard 
error. 
 
2.3.3 Discussion 
In this experiment, where T1 was an animal and T2 an emotional face, an 
attentional blink effect was found. The closer T2 followed T1-presentation, the less 
often participants correctly identified it. Perhaps most interestingly, the magnitude of 
this attentional blink when T2 follows T1 most closely – at lag-1-, was modulated by 
emotion of the face and by social anxiety. Specifically, at lag-1 those who are low in 
social anxiety made more errors in correctly identifying happy faces compared to both 
their own performance for disgusted faces and when compared to those high in social 
anxiety.  
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This effect is similar to the T1-effect in experiment 1, where happy T1s were 
more often incorrectly identified than disgusted T1-face targets in the low socially 
anxious groups. One explanation for this is that negative or threat-related expressions 
are salient and command attentional resources even when social anxiety is low 
(Eysenck, Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). However, happy faces may not be 
salient to low-socially anxious participants, meaning that they are less likely to break 
through the attentional blink for them than for high-socially anxious participants, who 
may allocate resources toward facial expressions generally. This would explain equal 
and high performance for participants high in social anxiety regardless on valence. 
However, the tasks used in experiments 1 and 2 required participants to make a 2-
alternative forced choice response on the emotion of the face and this face was always 
present. It is possible therefore that the attentional set of scanning the environment for 
emotional information plays a role in emotion detection. 
 
 Experiment 3: Implicit Emotion Detection 
 
2.4.1 Rationale 
Study two involved an explicit 2-alternative forced choice emotion-judgement 
task on the face-T2.  It was found that the most important effect involving social 
anxiety was that low-socially anxious individuals were worse at correctly identifying 
happy faces at lag-1, whilst their accuracy regarding disgusted faces was as high as 
for both emotions in the high-socially anxious group.  It is not clear from the results 
of experiments 1 and 2 whether the low anxious participants were simply not seeing 
the happy faces at lag-1 or whether they were seeing the face but misjudging it as 
being a disgusted face. Further, experiment 2 required participants to pay attention to 
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the emotion of the second target.  Due to its blocked design, participants knew that an 
emotional face would always be present in the dual-target blocks.  These task-
demands could have given rise to hypervigilance toward emotional faces due to 
expectations and alertness.  However, it does not provide any information as to 
whether such biases still exist if the environment is to be scanned without prior 
expectations.  Therefore, for Experiment 3 a number of changes were made to the 
design, including the use of a more implicit paradigm. 
The emotion judgement task from experiment 2 was replaced with a detection 
task, i.e. “Did you see a face?” with “yes/no” response alternatives. Single-target trials 
were randomised, rather than the block design followed in experiment one and two. 
This allowed for a target-detection rather than a target identification task, i.e.: “Was 
there a face?” instead of “What was the emotion of the face?” Consequently, accuracy 
could be measured as an implicit function of emotion. An additional advantage of this 
change is that it allowed for signal detection analysis. The randomisation of single-
target trials also lowered response biases related to expectancy, which could partially 
have accounted for the ceiling effect found in the previous experiment. 
In order to further avoid ceiling effects, a number of presentation 
characteristics were amended. The Gaussian blur was removed from the distractor 
stimuli, to improve target-distractor similarity (Müsch, Engel, & Schneider, 2012). 
Presentation rates were kept the same, but backwards masking was used on the face 
target.  
If the low socially anxious group’s larger amount of errors in detecting happy 
faces was driven by a response bias toward disgusted faces, these effects would 
disappear using a paradigm with implicit yes/no judgements (H1). Furthermore, it was 
predicted that an emotion-effect would be more apparent, given that ceiling-effects 
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should be absent with increased task-difficulty (H2). Finally, in line with anxiety-
related facilitated attention toward threat, those high in social anxiety should show a 
higher detection rate for disgusted T2s compared with low-socially anxious 
participants (H3). 
   
2.4.2 Method 
Participants. Participants were a new sample 32 (6 males) undergraduate 
students at the University of East Anglia who participated in return for course credit. 
Mean age was 19.7 years (S.D. = 0.76; range = 18.6 – 22.7). 
Materials. The same materials were used as were used in experiments one and 
two. The blurring Gaussian mask was removed from the distractor stimuli. Backward 
masks for T2-faces were created by scrambling the face area of the face-targets, in 
similar fashion to distractor items.  
Procedure. The procedure followed the same basic principles as in 
experiments one and two, with a few differences. 
Instead of four, eight practice trials were offered, using one animal-target 
(left/right-looking) and one face-target (neutral). Practice stimuli were not used 
throughout the actual experiment. If participants (n = 4) failed to correctly detect at 
least one presented face during the practice trials, the practice was run again.  
Furthermore, the presentation time of 6 frames (67ms) per stimulus was 
unchanged. However, T2 (faces) were presented for 3 frames, immediately followed 
by its unique mask for 3 frames, so T2+mask presentation made up an identical 
duration as the other stimuli in the RSVP stream. This backward masking was 
implemented to increase task difficulty in an attempt to reduce the ceiling effect of 
performance in experiments 1 and 2. It was reasoned that emotional information in 
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faces is processed after an even shorter presentation duration, however, it was decided 
that the overall rate of 67ms per stimulus should remain consistent. These backward 
masks were comprised of a scrambled neutral face with the same identity as the 
preceding T2. 
Analysis. As in the previous experiments, T2-accuracy was calculated for each 
participant. Only T1-correct trials were included, to ensure T1-processing was 
apparent. Two separate 2 × 2 × 3 ANOVAs were carried out: one for the SPIN (Social 
Anxiety; High, Low × Emotion; Happy, Disgusted × Lag; Lag-1, Lag-4, Lag-7) and 
one for the BFNE-S (Fear of Negative Evaluation; High, Low × Emotion; Happy, 
Disgusted × Lag; Lag-1, Lag-4, Lag-7).  
 
2.4.3 Results 
Mean SPIN score was 21.6 (S.D. = 11.7). Using the cut-off score of 19, 12 
participants (37.5%) were in the low-socially anxious group, and 20 (62.5%) were in 
the high-social anxiety group. As expected, the data was normally distributed across 
conditions (except for happy-lag7 and T2-absent correctness, both expected). A 2 
(SPIN-score; low, high) x 2 (T2-emotion; disgusted, happy) x 3 (Lag; 1, 4, 7) 
ANOVA yielded a main effect for emotion, with less accuracy on detection of 
disgusted faces (M = 59.4%, SE = 3.5) than happy faces (M = 68.6%, SE = 3.5); F(1, 
30) = 16.62, p < .001, η2 = .36. Furthermore, a main effect of lag, F(2, 30) = 29.93, p 
< .001, η2 = .50, illustrated that the attentional blink was present. Accuracy on lag-1 
(M = 49.5%, SE = 4.9) was lower than on lag-4 (M = 72.0%, SE = 3.1) and lag-7 (M = 
70.2%, SE = 3.2), both p < .001. Lag-4 accuracy and lag-7 accuracy were not 
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statistically different, p > .5. No effect for SPIN group was found. No other effects, 
including interactions were found, see Figure 6.6 
 
 
 
Figure 6. T2-present accuracy when T1 was correct in experiment 3, where T1 was 
neutral (animal) and T2-valence was manipulated (face) and present or absent for both 
social anxiety groups (SPIN). Participants made a judgement whether a face (T2) was 
present or absent, thus T2-emotion was task-irrelevant. The horizontal dotted line 
reflects accuracy on T2-absent trials (M = 88.2%, S.D. = 9.6). No social anxiety-
related effects were found, but accuracy on disgusted faces was poorer than when the 
face was happy across all participants. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects 
standard error. 
 
 
                                                
 
6 In the introduction of this experiment, it was explained that this paradigm allowed for signal 
detection analysis. Consequently, d’ was calculated as a function of Z(hit rate) and Z(false alarm rate). 
However, there were no statistical differences between these sensitivity indexes and the 
reported accuracy percentage, rendering reporting signal detection statistics redundant. 
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Mean BFNE-S score was 23.1 (S.D. = 7.57). Applying the cut-off of 28 results 
in 19 (59.4%) participants in the low-fear of negative evaluation group and 13 
(40.6%) with high-fear of negative evaluation. The findings were similar to the SPIN 
results7, see Figure 7. 
 
 
Figure 7. T2-present accuracy when T1 was correct in experiment 3, where T1 was 
neutral (animal) and T2-valence was manipulated (face) and present or absent for both 
fear of negative evaluation groups (BFNE-S). Participants made a judgement whether 
a face (T2) was present or absent, thus T2-emotion was task-irrelevant. The horizontal 
dotted line reflects accuracy on T2-absent trials (M = 88.2%, S.D. = 9.6). No fear of 
negative evaluation-related effects were found, but accuracy on disgusted faces was 
poorer than when the face was happy across all participants. Error bars represent +/- 1 
within-subjects standard error. 
 
                                                
 
7 Main effects Emotion* and Lag*, no other effects. Pairwise comparisons Emotion: detection 
disgusted (59.7%) < happy (69.1%)*. Lag: lag-1 (49.8%) < lag-4 (72.4%)*; lag-1 < lag-7 
(71.0%)*; lag-4 ≈ lag-7 (n.s.). * All ps < .001. 
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2.4.4 Discussion 
Firstly, If the low socially anxious group’s larger amount of errors in detecting 
happy faces was driven by a response bias toward disgusted faces, these effects would 
disappear using a paradigm with implicit yes/no judgements (H1). Furthermore, it was 
predicted that an emotion-effect would be more apparent, given that ceiling-effects 
should be absent with increased task-difficulty (H2). Finally, in line with anxiety-
related facilitated attention toward threat, those high in social anxiety should show a 
higher detection rate for disgusted T2s compared with low-socially anxious 
participants (H3). 
Taken together, the results of experiment 3 show that there is an attentional 
blink for emotional faces. Furthermore, a clear emotion effect was found: across 
participants, faces were more often detected when they had a happy compared to a 
disgusted expression. As this effect is not related to lag, it cannot be concluded that 
either emotion “breaks through” the attentional blink more easily. Experiment 3 found 
no effects of social anxiety.  
Finally, the task was difficult enough to solve the ceiling effect which was 
found in the previous experiment, where detection was nearly 100%. In this third 
experiment, detection rates were normally distributed. With performance lower at lag-
1 (chance levels), a strong and reliable attentional blink effect was found on a 
paradigm employing emotional faces as targets, which forms an inviting foundation 
for designing future studies with similar paradigms. 
 
 General Discussion 
The aim of these experiments was to examine social anxiety related facilitated 
attention toward threat as well as difficulty in disengagement. Experiment 1 explored 
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whether presenting an emotional target (T1) affects the attentional blink when the 
second target (T2) is a non-social neutral stimulus. If social anxiety is related to 
difficulties in disengaging attention away from potential threat (Cisler & Koster, 
2010), those participants high in social anxiety would have lower accuracy for T2 
identification when T1 was a disgusted face. For experiment 2, target-order was 
reversed, so that T1 was neutral and T2 emotional. Specifically, it was investigated 
whether socially relevant information “breaks through” the attentional blink more for 
socially anxious individuals than for those lower in social anxiety, which would 
provide evidence for accounts of anxiety-related facilitated orienting toward threat. 
Finally, experiment 3 saw a modulation of task demands. Again, T1 was neutral and 
T2 emotional, but this emotional T2 was not always present in the stream. Participants 
did not make an emotion-decision, but were asked whether they saw a face. If anxiety 
is related to vigilant scanning of the environment, it should result in higher detection 
rates for socially anxious than for non-socially anxious participants for socially 
anxious participants. 
Experiment 1, where T1 valence was manipulated, no social anxiety related 
differences in T2 performance emerged. However, in experiment 2, which used an 
emotional T2, happy faces did not attenuate the attentional blink for those low in 
social anxiety. This pattern of poor performance for happy faces in low socially 
anxious participants is confirmed in T1 analysis of experiment one: those low in 
social anxiety appear to have more difficulty identifying happy faces when they are 
scanning the environment for emotion judgements. On the other hand, experiment 3 
showed that performance on disgusted faces was poorer than for happy faces in both 
groups when the presence of a face was task-relevant, but its emotional expression 
was not.  
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Whereas low-socially anxious participants were poorer at detection of happy 
faces in experiment one (where the face was shown at T1) and at lag-1 in experiment 
two (where the face was shown at T2), which employed explicit 2-alternative forced 
choice emotion judgements, the findings of experiment 3 were in the opposite 
direction, suggesting that when emotion search goals are not activated, happy faces 
are easier to detect than disgusted faces for all participants. This suggests that 
previous results were not driven by a general impairment in the detection of happy 
faces in participants with lower social anxiety but rather that task goals affect 
attention allocation to emotional expressions differentially for low and high socially 
anxious participants. The results suggest that when an emotion-relevant task goal is 
given, both happy and disgusted faces command attentional resources in high socially 
anxious participants. In comparison, for low socially anxious participants, when an 
emotion-relevant task goal is given, only disgusted faces command attentional 
resources.  
 These results do not directly provide support for the previous findings in the 
literature, which, nonetheless, have been inconsistent. For example, an attentional 
blink may not be found when targets were faces compared to pictures of objects as 
distractors (Landau & Bentin, 2008); or when face targets were presented among a 
stream of digits (Awh et al., 2004). Task-irrelevant emotional stimuli, such as scenes, 
found an attentional blink in a number of studies (McHugo, Olatunji, & Zald, 2013; 
Most, et al., 2005). However, when targets were emotional faces, the attentional blink 
effect across the literature is less evident. For example, an attentional blink has been 
found for fearful faces compared with neutral faces when participants were instructed 
to report the emotion (such as in experiment 1 and 2 in the current chapter); but not 
when they had to report the gender or when the face was to be ignored (Stein et al., 
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2009). The current study provides further evidence that the attentional blink depends 
on task characteristics modulating the attentional set of participants (Stein et al., 
2009). 
Besides availability of resources, perceptual salience of faces within 
distractors could also account for the absence of a blink for faces (Landau & Bentin, 
2008). This corresponds with another study that attempted to systematically 
investigate the influence of target-distractor similarity in attentional blink paradigms 
with faces (Müsch et al., 2012). When targets could be easily discriminated from each 
other, as well as from distractors (by either insufficient backwards masking or target-
distractor similarity), the attentional blink was minimal or absent for emotional faces. 
The authors suggested that target-distractor similarity is a more important 
consideration than attentional task demands for eliciting an attentional blink. 
Consequently, a task needs to be developed with certain characteristics in order to 
assess modulations in the attentional blink effect to be accounted for by social anxiety 
rather than task properties and demands. 
The implicit nature of experiment 3 may also provide a further indication that 
emotional modulation of the attentional blink is not driven by response bias, which 
confirms the findings by Tibboel, Bockstaele, and Houwer (2011). It is thought that 
emotional processing requires only few attentional resources (Fox et al., 2005). It 
could be possible that emotional information from faces is processed using different 
channels than other information (Ahw et al., 2004), which may explain the lack of 
strong attentional blink effects compared to traditional studies having used, for 
example, digits and numbers.  
Taken together, a few social anxiety related effects emerged from the current 
experiments. When scanning the environment for emotional information, as required 
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in experiments 1 and 2, those high in social anxiety process this information 
accurately, regardless of valence. Positive information may not be salient for those 
low in social anxiety, explaining the difficulties in happy face-detection. When 
environmental scanning does not require explicit emotional vigilance, happy faces 
elicited preferential processing compared to threatening information, regardless of 
social anxiety. In conclusion, the attentional blink paradigm shows some promise for 
the study of temporal aspects of attentional biases in social anxiety.  However, tasks 
with different demands and better target-distractor similarity need to be employed to 
utilise the attentional blink paradigm to its fullest potential as a means to disentangle 
biases related to facilitated attention and difficulty in attentional disengagement.  
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3 Temporal Attentional Biases in Child Social Anxiety: the 
Attentional Blink 
 
 
Attentional biases are suggested to play a role in maintaining social anxiety in adults. 
Chapter 2 explored this using the emotional attentional blink paradigm. However, 
relatively little is known about the role of biases in childhood social anxiety. In the 
present study, 67 participants aged 10-11 years completed an attentional blink task 
designed to explore facilitated attention toward threatening stimuli in the temporal 
domain. A neutral, non-social first target (T1) was followed by a disgusted or happy 
face (T2) at lag-1, lag-4 or lag-7, with stimuli being presented at a rate of 67ms per 
image. Participants made forced choice judgements on T1 and on the emotion of the 
T2 face. Participants completed the social anxiety scale for children-revised (SASC-
R; LaGreca & Stone, 1993). Social anxiety levels were negatively related to emotion 
detection, irrespective of valence and lag. This could indicate that the association 
between social anxiety and threat-related attentional biases may not emerge until 
later in life.  
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 Background and Rationale 
 
3.1.1 Attention bias in anxiety 
The literature review in this thesis (chapter 1) and the attentional blink 
experiments (chapter 2) saw that social anxiety is believed to be maintained by 
attentional biases in emotional processing (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mathews & 
MacLeod, 1994). Attentional biases toward threat relate to differential allocation of 
attention when processing threatening stimuli compared with non-threatening stimuli 
(Bar Haim et al., 2007; Cisler & Koster, 2010; MacLeod, et al., 1986; Mogg & 
Bradley, 1998). It is thought that an attentional bias can be underpinned by various 
components, namely facilitated attention toward threat, difficulties disengaging 
attention away from threat and/or attentional avoidance of threat (see Cisler and 
Koster (2010) for a review). Facilitated attention toward threat involves faster 
orientation toward threatening stimuli. Difficulty with disengaging occurs when 
attention is captured by threat and switching attention to another stimulus is impaired. 
Finally, when both threatening and non-threatening stimuli are presented and attention 
is preferably allocated to the non-threat, it indicates attentional avoidance of threat. 
Attentional biases for threat-relevant stimuli are typically more pronounced in anxious 
individuals than non-anxious individuals, and are not consistently displayed by non-
anxious individuals (Bar-Haim et al., 2007; Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Williams, 
Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996). Biases have been observed in a range of anxiety 
disorders (Shechner et al., 2012). In the present study the focus is on attentional bias 
in child social anxiety. 
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3.1.2 Child Social Anxiety 
Difficulties with social anxiety often originate in childhood (e.g. Gamble and 
Rapee, 2009; Puliafico & Kendall, 2006) and it is believed that between 2.5% and 
15% of children and adolescents suffer from an anxiety disorder (Rapee, Schniering 
& Hudson, 2009). However, there is a lack of research examining attentional biases in 
childhood social anxiety (Seefeldt, Krämer, Tuschen-Caffier & Heinrichs, 2014). In 
contrast, a number of studies examined attentional biases in adult social anxiety. 
Overall, the findings have been somewhat mixed. For example, in one study 
employing a visual search paradigm, high socially anxious adults showed a bias 
toward threat when angry faces were presented, compared with neutral or happy faces 
(Esteves, 1999). Using a dot-probe task, Sposari and Rapee (2007) found that those 
high in social anxiety attended to emotional faces over household items, regardless of 
the valence of the face suggesting a more general bias toward social stimuli. This 
study was a replication of a study by Mansell, Clark, Ehlers and Chen (1999), who 
reported contradictory findings; in their dot-probe tasks (also with emotional faces 
and household items) participants with social anxiety were faster to respond to targets 
that were not on the location of the face, regardless of valence, indicating avoidance 
of potential threat from social stimuli. In sum, many questions about the nature of 
attentional bias toward emotional faces in social anxiety remain (Yiend, 2010).  
As previously indicated, only a few studies have investigated attentional 
biases in child social anxiety. One example is an eyetracking study which found social 
anxiety related hypervigilance toward angry faces in a free viewing task when angry-
neutral stimulus pairs were presented, but only if social fears were induced prior with 
a stressor task (Seefeldt et al., 2014). Regarding other types of childhood anxiety, 
studies have demonstrated that children who are high in anxiety more generally, 
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display preferential processing of threatening stimuli, such as angry faces (Bar-Haim 
et al., 2007; Waters, Henry, Mogg, Bradley, & Pine, 2010). For example, research 
using the dot-probe task has shown that anxious children and adolescents display 
threat biases toward angry faces compared with neutral faces (Shechner et al., 2012; 
Waters et al., 2010). Furthermore, there is some evidence that children with higher 
levels of anxiety have faster reaction times for angry faces in visual search tasks 
(Hadwin et al, 2003). A recent meta-analysis on attention bias in child anxiety 
confirms that anxious children show a greater bias toward threat than non-anxious 
children; however, differences between anxious and control participants appear to 
increase with age (Dudeney et al., 2015). Taken together, these studies suggest that 
child social anxiety is related to preferential processing of angry faces in the spatial 
domain.  
Dot-probe tasks and visual search paradigms are informative in regards with 
attentional biases in spatial visual processing. However, they tell us little about 
attentional biases in the temporal domain. Therefore, exploring these components 
under conditions of temporal, serial processing, could provide new insights into 
anxiety-related attention. Toward this objective, the present study employs an 
emotional adaptation of the attentional blink paradigm to examine whether children 
who are high in social anxiety show facilitated orientation toward perceived threat 
compared with children low in social anxiety, or whether they display attentional 
avoidance of threatening stimuli.  
To provide a brief review of the attentional blink paradigm, as discussed in 
chapters 1 and 2: detecting a first (T1) target leads to an impairment of detecting the 
second (T2) target when it is presented briefly after T1 (Ciesielski et al.,, 2010; 
Raymond et al., 1992). However, emotional faces as T2 reduce this impairment 
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relative to neutral faces (De Jong et al, 2009; Maratos et al., 2008), which indicates 
facilitated processing of emotional faces. Examining how this impairment in detecting 
an emotional T2 is affected by social anxiety would be in keeping with the facilitated 
attention to threat component of attention bias (Cisler & Koster, 2010). 
To date, limited research has examined the association between social anxiety 
and attentional bias using face stimuli with children and to our knowledge, no studies 
have used the attentional blink paradigm. The attentional blink has however been used 
with children in other areas of research such as reading research. In these tasks letters, 
words, or geometrical shapes were used (e.g. Bar-Haim et al., 2007; McLean, Castles, 
Coltheart, & Stuart, 2010; Mclean, Stuart, Visser, & Castles, 2009). One exception is 
a paper by Yerys et al. (2013), which used an attentional blink paradigm with angry 
and neutral faces to investigate attentional differences between children with Autism 
Spectrum Disorders and typically developing children. Overall, an attentional blink 
was found where angry T2 faces were detected more accurately than neutral faces. 
However, no group differences were found, which led the researchers to conclude that 
early visual attention to emotional facial expressions was preserved in children with 
ASD. It is suggested that children and adolescents who are high on the autism 
spectrum often have higher levels of social anxiety (Kuusikko et al., 2008) but this 
was not examined by Yerys and colleagues. Therefore there appears to be a gap in the 
literature regarding the attentional blink for emotional faces in child social anxiety. 
 
3.1.3 The current experiment 
This chapter aims to investigate whether children with higher social anxiety 
display attentional biases toward emotional stimuli when attentional capacities are 
limited relative to children with lower social anxiety, and in doing so, to explore 
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whether the attentional blink task could prove a useful paradigm for examining 
attentional biases in child anxiety. An attentional blink task with neutral T1 and 
emotional T2 is used, with the emotional T2 being disgusted or happy faces. 
Expressions of happiness are emotionally relevant, but not threatening. In contrast, 
disgust relates to interpersonal conflict and/or disapproval (Phillipott et al., 1999) and 
may reflect a negative social judgement (Rossignol, Anselme, Vermeulen, Philippot, 
& Campanella, 2007). This emotional expression may be particularly relevant for 
individuals high in social anxiety, a characteristic of which is a fear is of being 
negatively evaluated by others (Bögels & Mansell, 2004; Clark & Wells, 1995; Rapee 
& Heimberg, 1997). In line with the literature that suggests that anxiety is related to 
threat related attention bias, the following is hypothesised. In dual-target trials, when 
available attentional resources for T2 are competing with the processing of a neutral 
T1, socially anxious children have a higher accuracy for disgusted compared with 
happy T2s compared with non-socially anxious children. This would indicate anxiety-
related facilitated attention toward threat. However, when attentional resources are 
more available to process an emotional face, in single-target trials, there will be no 
anxiety related differences in accuracy for disgusted and for happy faces. Due to the 
exploratory nature of the present study, an additional research question is whether the 
emotional attentional blink has the potential to be a suitable method for investigating 
attention bias in child social anxiety.  
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 Method 
 
3.2.1 Participants 
Participants were 67 children (34 female) in year-6 of a local primary school 
(Age: M = 11.4 years, S.D. = 0.50). Parental opt-out consent was sought as well as 
child verbal assent. Participation was voluntary and children were free to withdraw at 
any time. Ethical approval was granted by the Research Ethics Committee at the 
University of East-Anglia. In coordination with the relevant class teachers, it was 
ensured that none of the participants had any learning disabilities or developmental 
disorders, such as autism.  
 
3.2.2 Stimuli and apparatus 
Twelve emotional images from the Radboud Faces Database’s children subset 
(RaFD; Langner et al., 2010) were used in the attentional blink task: a happy and a 
disgusted expression for each of six child actors (three female, three male). Distractor 
stimuli consisted of nine different child actors from the same dataset, with neutral 
expressions. The face areas of these images were scrambled. For the non-social, 
neutral targets, the same animal images from chapter 2 were used.  
All images were grayscale and were edited in Adobe Photoshop CS4. Faces 
were matched on size and position, by positioning the center of the pupils on the same 
coordinates. Overall grayness value was equalized between images.  
The experiment was programmed and presented using the PsychoPhysics 
Toolbox-3 (Brainard, 1997) in Matlab 2013a. The task was presented on a 13” 
MacBook (OS X 10.8). Responses were collected using a USB mouse. 
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Social anxiety symptoms were assessed using the Social Anxiety Scale for 
Children - Revised (SASC-r; La Greca & Stone, 1993; see Appendix C). This 
questionnaire asks children to agree or disagree with 22 items by circling the 
respective number (1 = not at all to 5 = all of the time; example item: “I’m afraid that 
other kids will not like me”). Higher total scores reflect higher social anxiety, whilst 
subscales provide scores of Fear of Negative Evaluation From Peers (FNE), Social 
Avoidance and Distress Specific to New Situations (SAD-New), and Generalized 
Social Avoidance and Distress (SAD-G). Internal consistency for this measure in the 
present sample was α = .88. 
 
3.2.3 Design 
 The presentation parameters of the Attentional Blink task, such as number and 
order of stimuli and blocks was identical to the studies in chapter 2. However, the  
two-alternative forced choice response, asked the participant whether the animal was 
looking left or right  with symbols rather than words (“<--” or “-->”). Furthermore, 
this child version consisted of 4 blocks of 36 trials instead of 72. 
 
3.2.4 Procedure 
 Children were tested individually in a private room and sat approximately 60 
centimeters from the screen. The task was explained in the following manner. 
Children were told that they would play a game on the computer and that they would 
see pictures flash up quickly on the screen. Their job was to look for animals and 
faces, which would be hidden between the other pictures. They were told that they 
would go through some questions too after the game. Next, the single-target task was 
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explained in more detail. Children were told that there would be jumbled-up faces, but 
also a normal one, and they had to think about whether the normal face was feeling 
happy or discussed. They were then asked whether they could show the experimenter 
a happy face, and a disgusted face. Next, they were shown an example of each 
emotion and were asked to guess whether the example was looking happy or 
disgusted, after which they practiced four practice single-target trials with the same 
example face, which was a different stimulus than in the experimental trials.  
The dual-target task was explained next. Children were told that besides the 
face, they would also look for an animal and had to remember whether it was looking 
left or right. They then looked at an example that was not used in the experiment and 
practiced four dual-target trials with the examples. After practicing both tasks, they 
were shown all six animals that would appear in the task and were asked to name 
them. They were told that there would be four blocks of about four minutes each and 
that they could take breaks between blocks if they liked.  
After these task instructions and practice trials, the attentional blink task was 
completed. In total, the attentional blink task took approximately 15 minutes. After 
completing the attentional blink task, children completed the questionnaire before 
being debriefed. 
 
3.2.5 Analysis 
Accuracy scores for target detection in single-target trials were collected, as 
were correct T1 and T2 judgments in the dual-target trials. For dual-target trials, the 
dependent variable T2-detection was analysed if T1 was correct. This data was found 
to be considerably negatively skewed due to a ceiling-effect in task performance: even 
with images presented at a rate of 67ms per stimuli, children were remarkably 
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accurate in their judgments. Therefore only participants who displayed a performance 
of less than 100% on lag-1 detection were selected for further analysis (N = 39) and 
included in the results that follow. The included sample did not differ on age, gender, 
and social anxiety from participants that were excluded. To analyse this data, first, the 
single-target task was analysed to examine whether social anxiety affected basic 
emotion recognition on an RSVP task. Second, a 2 (emotion; happy, disgusted) × 3 
(lag; lag-1, lag-4, lag-7) GLM was carried out without social anxiety included to 
clarify whether an attentional blink effect was present. Finally, an identical GLM was 
conducted including total scores on the SASC-R as a covariate. As there are no 
known clinical cut-off scores for the SASC-R, as opposed to the questionnaires used 
in chapter 2, maintaining the continuous nature of the scores was preferred to a 
median split. Follow-up GLM analyses were also conducted using SASC-R subscales. 
Descriptive statistics are shown in Table 1.  
 
 Results 
Mean score on the SASC-R was 39.6, S.D. = 14.7. Tests of normality revealed 
that these scores were not normally distributed (Kolmogorov-Smirnov p = .003; 
Shapiro-Wilk p < .001), but positively skewed. 
Where the data failed to meet assumptions of sphericity, Greenhouse-Geisser 
corrected values are reported with the original degrees of freedom to favour legibility. 
In the single target task, social anxiety did not affect performance on emotion 
identification; F(1, 36) = 1.25, p = .276, ηp2 = .033. There was no main effect of 
emotion; F(1, 36) = 0.24, p = .624, ηp2 = .007. Neither was an emotion × social 
anxiety interaction found; F(1, 36) = 0.04, p = .841, ηp2 = .001. 
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 In dual-target trials, mean T1 (animal) identification was 78.0% (S.D. = 14.5). 
Without social anxiety as a covariate, examining T2 (emotion) identification on 
correct-T1 trials indicated that there was an attentional blink effect (main effect for 
lag; F(2, 76) = 6.65, p = .004, ηp2 = .149). Pairwise comparisons showed that T2 
accuracy at lag-1 (M = 75.4%, SE = 2.1) was less accurate than at lag-4 (M = 81.8, SE 
= 2.3) and at lag-7 (M = 82.2, SE = 2.7); p = .001 and p = .013 respectively. No 
significant differences were found between lag-4 and lag-7. Neither a main effect of 
emotion or an emotion × lag interaction effect was found. 
When including SASC-R total scores as a covariate in the above analysis, a 
main effect of social anxiety was found; F(1, 37) = 4.28, p = .046, ηp2 = .104; higher 
total scores on the SASC-R were related to poorer emotion-identification 
performance. There were no main effects for either emotion or lag and no two-way 
interactions for social anxiety × emotion and social anxiety × lag; ps > .249, ηp2s < 
.037 
 
Table 1. 
Correct T2-emotion detection (%) without social anxiety as a covariate. 
 Mean (S.E.) [95% C.I.] 
 Single-target trials Lag-1 (67ms) Lag-4 (268ms) Lag-7 (469ms) 
Happy 92.6 (1.5) 
[89.6 – 95.7] 
76.7 (2.2) 
[72.2 – 81.2] 
83.7 (2.3) 
[79.0 – 88.3] 
82.2 (3.0) 
[76.2 – 88.2] 
Disgusted 90.0 (2.3) 
[85.3 – 94.6] 
74.1 (2.4) 
[69.2 – 79.0] 
79.9 (2.8) 
[74.2 – 85.7] 
82.2 (3.2) 
[75.7 – 88.7] 
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Table 1 and Figure 8 illustrate the lack of interaction effects when social 
anxiety was included as a covariate. In other words, when adjusted for social anxiety, 
T2 performance was similar across all three lags, indicating the absence of an 
emotional attentional blink. To illustrate this pattern in Figure 8, SASC-r scores were 
binned into a low-social anxiety group (Z-score < -.80; N = 8) and a high-social 
anxiety group (Z-score > .80; N = 6). For Figure 8, a 2 (Social anxiety; low, high) × 2 
(emotion; happy, disgusted) × 3 (lag; lag-1, lag-4, lag-7) ANOVA was carried out. 
Due to the low number of participants in each group, this ANOVA yielded no 
significant results, including a main effect for social anxiety; F(1, 12) = 2.12, p = .17, 
ηp2 = .150. The effect size indicates that there is not enough power due to the low 
number of participants (observed power = .27).  
 
Figure 8. Performance on each T2-emotion across lags. Normalised SASC-R scores 
were binned into low social anxiety (LSA; < -.80 SD from the mean) and high social 
anxiety (HSA; > .80 SD from the mean) groups. The horizontal dotted line reflects 
accuracy on single-target trials in this sample (M = 87.9%, S.D. = 16.3). Emotion 
recognition was poorer in de HSA group relative to the LSA group, regardless of 
valence. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard error. 
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 Discussion 
This study aimed to explore attentional biases in child social anxiety and 
consider the utility of the attentional blink paradigm for this purpose. It was 
hypothesised that those children with higher social anxiety would show biases toward 
threatening stimuli relative to children lower on this trait. An additional aim was to 
explore whether these biases manifest as avoidance of threat or facilitated orientation 
toward threat when attentional capacity is limited. It was found that participants with 
higher social anxiety scores more frequently failed to identify disgusted as well as 
happy faces when processing a neutral T1 target compared with those lower in social 
anxiety. These results do not therefore support the hypothesised attentional bias for 
negative emotions in child social anxiety.  
This main effect for social anxiety was particularly pronounced in the Fear of 
Negative Evaluation subscale, followed by a marginally significant main effect for 
Generalised Avoidance and Distress subscale. Interestingly these main effects were 
not echoed for the subscale measuring Social Avoidance and Distress Specific to New 
Situations. 
On the single target trials, no effect of social anxiety on emotion identification 
was found. This indicates that social anxiety symptoms in children were not linked to 
poor emotion identification per se. Rather, the results suggest that higher social 
anxiety may be linked to difficulties in emotional processing when attentional 
capacity is limited. Potentially such difficulties may increase or maintain social 
anxiety: socially anxious children have been found to be poorer at emotion 
recognition than non-socially anxious controls (Simonian, Beidel, Turner, Berkes, & 
Long, 2001). Therefore emotion recognition requires more attentional resources, 
which may lead them to avoid processing faces. If socially anxious children then 
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‘learn’ to process emotions differently, it would be in line with the finding that 
anxiety-related biases are more pronounced with age (Dudeney et al., 2015). To tease 
apart some of these explanations, in future studies, a present/absent condition 
analogous to experiment 3 of chapter 2 would permit investigation into whether 
children do not see the face at all in dual-target trials, or whether they cannot process 
the emotion as suggested. 
Another potential explanation for poorer performance of those children with 
higher social anxiety in the dual-target, but not in the single-target task, lies in 
processing efficiency theory (Eysenck & Calvo, 1992). This theory proposes that 
anxiety disrupts two executive functions of attentional control: inhibition of automatic 
responses and the ability to shift attention between tasks (Eysenck, Derakshan, 
Santos, & Calvo, 2007), resulting in impaired attention on complex and attentionally 
demanding tasks relative to simpler tasks (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). Following 
on from processing efficiency theory, Derakshan and Eysenck’s (2009) attentional 
control theory predicts that anxiety affects performance via its disadvantageous 
effects on attentional control. In line with this, it could be reasoned that the nature of 
the testing situation in the current experiment elevated participants’ state anxiety and 
therefore reduced their processing efficiency/attentional control. It is reasonable to 
expect that the testing situation may have a more pronounced effect on state anxiety, 
and in turn processing efficiency/attentional control, for participants with high social 
anxiety. As the present study did not include a control T2 task that was not emotional, 
it is not possible to evaluate this possibility with the current data. However, one recent 
paper found that individuals with social anxiety disorder and current comorbid 
depression showed poorer performance on T2 number targets in a stream of letters 
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compared with healthy controls (Morrison et al, 2016), which is consistent with this 
explanation of the present findings.  
Whereas the Attentional Blink is robust for targets such as letters and symbols 
(Raymond et al., 1992), tasks with faces have yielded mixed results (Eagles & 
Murphy, 2016). For example, Awh et al. (2004) found no attentional blink when T1 
was a letter and T2 was a neutral face. With regard to emotional faces, these appear to 
have a lower detection threshold at T2 than neutral faces (de Jong et al, 2009; Maratos 
et al., 2008), which would indicate facilitated processing of emotional facial 
expressions. In the present study there was some evidence of an attentional blink in 
preliminary analyses that did not include social anxiety as a covariate. This was not 
robust however, with the effect of lag no longer significant once social anxiety was 
included as a covariate. These results are in line with evidence that salient emotional 
information is accessible even when limited attentional resources are available (De 
Martino, Kalisch, Rees, & Dolan, 2009). 
There are some reasons to be cautious when interpreting the present results. 
Most notably, there was a ceiling effect in performance with 40% of participants 
achieving 100% in T2 at lag 1. Thus, the current design may not be very sensitive for 
assessing individual differences. A more difficult task could be implemented in order 
to achieve a more typical performance distribution. For example, a briefer target 
presentation followed by a backward mask could potentially decrease mean accuracy. 
Another possibility is varying the task-demands. In the current experiment, 
participants knew when they were doing a block of dual-target trials and when they 
were doing only single-target trials. Perhaps this allowed them to tune in their 
attentional set toward task characteristics. Trial types could be randomised across 
trials. Instead of trial-type information offered before each trial, task demands would 
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only become clear during each trial, or potentially after, when the participants see the 
question(s) they are asked. Nevertheless, this study provides new insights into 
potential deficiencies in emotional attention in child social anxiety and provides a 
useful foundation for future work using the attentional blink task to examine 
attentional biases in childhood anxiety.  
In conclusion, the current findings suggest that those children higher in social 
anxiety show poorer emotion recognition than those with lower social anxiety when 
attentional capacity is limited. However, it is recommended that the attentional blink 
task design is refined before further use, perhaps in clinical samples is considered. 
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4 Fast eye-movements move toward emotional faces 
whereas slow ones deviate away: an eye-tracking study 
 
Emotional faces convey social information, and their processing may occur without 
top-down attention. Saccade trajectories of eye movements are thought to be driven 
by stimulus properties as well as goal-directed control, which explains deviations 
toward versus deviations away from distractors in the visual field. In this study 
participants’ eye movements were recorded whilst faces were presented as task-
irrelevant distractors. It was found that, for fast saccades, saccade trajectory curved 
towards emotional faces relative to neutral faces. However, slow saccades deviated 
away from these, likely driven by top-down control. Furthermore, effects of social 
anxiety were explored. The results indicated that those higher in social anxiety, may 
initiate their saccades towards emotional faces, regardless of response time. These 
findings demonstrate that attention is captured by social information, and support the 
hypervigilance/avoidance accounts of attentional biases in social anxiety.  
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 Background and rationale 
 
4.1.1 Eye-tracking and emotional attention 
As outlined in the previous chapters, some behavioural studies suggested that 
emotional information affects attentional processing. Evidence for this comes, for 
example, from visual search tasks, in which participants were more efficient at 
searching for emotional than neutral stimuli (Eastwood, Smilek, & Merikle, 2003; 
Öhman, Lundqvist, & Esteves, 2001). It is thought that the prioritised perception of 
emotional stimuli occurs through a fast-acting subcortical pathway (LeDoux, 2000). 
Given that that the superior colliculus and the pulvinar within this pathway are 
involved in saccadic motor generation, thus underlining the role of these visuomotor 
regions on emotional processing (West, Al-Aidroos, Susskind, & Pratt, 2011), eye-
tracking may provide novel insights into emotion processing and attention.  
 
4.1.2 Saccade curvature; studies and theories 
When people redirect their eyes from one location to another, these saccades 
are rarely in a straight line (Viviani, Berthos, & Tracey, 1977; Yarbus, 1967). This 
saccadic curvature is a sensitive measure of the influence of distractors on attention 
(Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002) and can either be directed away or toward elements in the 
visual field. In a typical saccadic curvature task, emotional images are used as task-
irrelevant distractors. This method can therefore be used to ascertain whether 
emotional stimuli are automatically prioritised in visual selection (Schmidt, et al., 
2012). Belopolsky and Theeuwes (2009) suggested that the mechanisms responsible 
for covert attention are the same mechanisms responsible for saccade generation. 
Furthermore, it is argued that deviations toward stem from competition between 
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elements in the oculomotor system, whereas deviations away are associated with top-
down control (Van der Stigchel, Meeter, & Theeuwes, 2006). In other words, saccade 
trajectories are thought to be affected by both stimulus-driven features and goal-
directed control (Van Zoest & Donk, 2006). Related to this are findings that saccades 
deviate away more strongly from stimuli if they are more salient (Belopolsky & 
Theeuwes, 2009; Doyle & Walker, 2001; Godijn & Theeuwes, 2002; Ludwig & 
Gilchrist, 2003).  
A few studies have examined the effect of affective stimuli on saccade 
deviation to indicate the salient nature of emotional information, but their findings 
have been mixed. Some studies have used paradigms where only one distractor was 
present. In one study it was found that saccade trajectories deviated away from angry 
faces (Petrova & Wentura, 2012). In line with this, when emotional faces were paired 
with objects it was found that eyes curved more away from angry faces than from 
happy or neutral faces (Schmidt et al., 2012). Socially relevant distractors resulted in 
greater deviations away from these distractors, with no difference between upright or 
inverted faces (Laidlaw, Badiudeen, Zhu, & Kingstone, 2015) and saccade trajectory 
was no more affected by participants’ own faces than those of unfamiliar strangers 
(Qian, Gao, & Wang, 2015). On the other hand, a study that presented a negative and 
positive scene simultaneously as distractor items, found that saccade endpoints were 
pulled toward distractors comprised of negative scenes (McSorley & Van Reekum, 
2013).  
 
4.1.3 Influence of saccade latencies. 
Much eye movement research with emotional stimuli has investigated effects 
of task-driven stimulus onset asynchrony (SOA) and has indicated that the timing of 
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saccade onset may be important. For example, saccades were found to be directed 
toward salient distractors when the saccade onset latency was short, whereas more 
slowly initiated saccades deviate away from salient distractors (Van Zoest & Donk, 
2006). Similarly, exploratory findings from McSorley and Van Reekum (2013) 
suggested that early saccades result in more deviation toward images depicting 
unpleasant scenes than later saccades. These timing-associated differences in findings 
may reflect the relative influence of stimulus-driven properties and top down control, 
with the latter having less influence on early saccades. 
 
4.1.4 Social anxiety and saccadic curvature 
To summarise the previous chapters: anxiety is thought to be related to 
cognitive biases for threatening stimuli, including an attentional bias (e.g. see Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). As discussed, three underlying mechanisms of these attentional 
biases have been identified; facilitated attention toward threat, delayed disengagement 
from threat, and attentional avoidance (Cisler & Koster, 2010). More specifically, the 
hypervigilance-avoidance account of anxiety suggests that those with higher anxiety 
levels are initially hyper-vigilant toward threat, followed by attentional avoidance 
(e.g. Mogg et al., 1997; 2004). Eyetracking studies of visual attention are ideal for 
studying the time-course and mechanisms underpinning these cognitive biases. For 
example, support for the hypervigilance-avoidance hypothesis in social anxiety comes 
from a free-viewing paradigm, during which participants with more fear of negative 
evaluation initially looked more at emotional faces, followed by avoidance of these 
faces (Wieser, Pauli, Weyers, Alpers, & Mühlberger, 2009). In their meta-analytic 
review of eye-tracking in affective disorders, Armstrong and Olatunji (2012) found 
support for the vigilance hypothesis of anxiety; anxious individuals demonstrated 
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facilitated orienting towards threat in free viewing tasks and facilitated detection of 
threat during visual search tasks. Furthermore, it has been shown that low-anxious 
individuals showed slower saccade onsets in response to positive stimuli relative to 
high-anxious individuals, which indicates that anxiety could also be associated with 
facilitated processing of positive information (Chen, Clarke, Watson, MacLeod, & 
Guastella, 2014). 
 
4.1.5 Research questions and hypotheses 
In the study presented within this chapter, the role of emotional faces and 
social anxiety on saccade trajectory is investigated. The hypervigilance-avoidance 
hypothesis of attentional biases in social anxiety is explored, by classifying each 
participant’s saccades into two SOA-bins: fast saccades, defined by saccades with 
onsets below each participant’s median, versus slow saccades, those above their 
median. Participants made eye movements from cues to targets which consisted of 
typographic characters, whilst emotional and neutral faces were presented as 
peripheral distractors. It is predicted that individual fast eye movements deviate 
toward the emotional faces (relative to neutral faces) faces, whereas slower saccades 
deviate away. Furthermore, effects of social anxiety on saccade trajectory are 
explored, in order to contribute to theoretical models of hypervigilance and avoidance 
in the social anxiety literature: the results for high-socially anxious participants 
compared to participants who are low in social anxiety will show a general tendency 
of saccades to deviate toward emotional stimuli as a marker of hypervigilance or 
away from emotional stimuli as a marker of avoidance, regardless of onset-latency. 
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 Method 
4.2.1 Participants 
37 undergraduate students took part in exchange for course credit, of which 6 
failed to reach the criterion of minimum 70% of correctly tracked trials; N = 31 (5 
males), Mean age = 20.0 years, S. D. = 1.21. Participants reported normal or 
corrected-to-normal vision.  
 
4.2.2 Materials 
Stimulus presentation was controlled by a desktop computer with a 46cm 
screen (1024 x 768 pixels). Eye position was recorded with a desktop mount Eyelink 
1000 eye-tracker (SR Research, Ontario, Canada); using a spatial resolution of 0.1° 
and sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Recordings were made tracking the right eye.  
The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Conner et al., 2000) was used to measure 
social anxiety. The SPIN is a 17-item, self-rated questionnaire assessing the spectrum 
of fear, avoidance and psychological symptoms that are associated with social 
anxiety, providing a good internal consistency (see Appendix A). In addition, 
participants completed the Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation-Straightforwardly 
Worded (BFNE-S; Collins et al., 2005; Rodebaugh et al., 2011; see Appendix B). 
However only 5 out of 31 participants scored above the suggested cut-off of 28 
points. Consequently, this questionnaire was not used in the subsequent analyses. In 
this sample, there was a large, positive correlation between SPIN and BFNE-S; r = 
.50, p = .005. 
 
4.2.3 Stimuli 
Two female and two male identities with neutral, angry, disgusted and happy 
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expressions were selected from the NimStim dataset (Tottenham et al., 2009). 
Greyscale images were resized to 180w x 240h pixels and luminosity was equalised 
between all images.   
 
4.2.4 Procedure 
The experimental session took place in a well-lit room. Participants were 
positioned comfortably in a chin-rest, approximately 70 cm away from the screen. 
Each trial started with a 1500 ms blank screen, followed by a white fixation cross at 
the bottom of the screen (Courier New “+”, 36pt, centre at 653 y-px) for a random 
duration between 800 and 1200 ms, of which the last 100 ms was gaze contingent. 
The fixation cross would then change into a cue; either an upward arrow (Wingdings3 
“h”, 36pt), or a red cross (Webdings “r”, 36pt). Simultaneously, two faces appeared to 
the left (centre at 287 x-pixels) or the right (centre at 737 x-pixels) of the screen, as 
well as a white target cross at the top of the screen (Courier New “+”, 36pt, centre at 
115 y-pixels). One of the faces was always neutral, whereas the other had a neutral, 
angry, happy, or disgusted expression. Participants were instructed to fixate on the 
lower cross, and then respond to the cue. For go-trials, the cross would turn into an 
arrow, upon which the participants had to fixate as quickly as they could on the target 
at the top of the screen, which would turn green upon successful fixation. No go-trials 
were included, to avoid automaticity of responses. On these no-go trials, the bottom 
cross would turn into a red X. In this case, participants had to stay fixated on this 
position, or look back there as quickly as they could. Upon successful fixation, this 
cross turned green. See Figure 9 for a trial example. After instructions, participants 
did a practice session consisting of six trials in fixed order, with unique, neutral faces 
appearing on the screen. The experiment was divided into four blocks with a self-
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paced break between them. A standard 9-point calibration took place before the 
practice session, prior to each block, or after time-outs in gaze contingency. After the 
eye-tracking session, participants then filled out the questionnaires on the screen8. The 
whole session took approximately 45 minutes.  
 
Figure 9. Typical go-trial in the saccade curvature task with an angry face opposing a 
neutral face. The target turned green upon successful fixation, after which the next 
trial commenced. In no-go trials, a red X appeared instead of the arrow, which turned 
green upon successful fixation. 
 
4.2.5 Analysis 
Only Go-trials were included in the analysis. Saccades that happened around 
eye-blinks were removed. Saccades with latencies faster than 100ms from cue-onset 
were classified as anticipatory saccades and rejected. Furthermore, saccades larger 
than 2.5 standard deviations from individual means were defined as slow outliers and 
removed from the data. In order to exclude micro-saccades, undershoots and 
overshoots, valid saccades were those that started from within 2.5° from the centre of 
the cue and landed within 2.5° from the target’s centre. For each participant, median 
                                                
 
8	Participants also completed the Autism Quotient (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, 
Martin, & Clubley, 2001). This was not analysed in this chapter to keep within the theoretical 
scope of the thesis.	
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latency was then calculated as the interval between cue presentation and saccade 
onset, to allow classification of fast and slow saccades into two individual latency 
bins. Mean fast latency was 216 ms (S.D. = 27.5), mean slow latency was 305 ms 
(S.D. = 49.8). 
The following measures of saccade trajectory were used: saccade angle, 
maximum deviation, curve area, and the quadratic coefficient of the curve. The 
saccade angle is defined as the angle in degrees from the start point of the saccade to 
its endpoint, with 0° being vertically upwards, providing an indication of relative 
saccade endpoint. Maximum deviation refers to the maximum distance of the saccade 
signature from a straight line drawn between the start point and the endpoint of the 
saccade (Smit & Van Gisbergen, 1990), with curve area being measured as the 
surface between these two lines (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002). Quadratic coefficient is 
based on a quadratic polynomial curve fitting approach, which is less susceptible to 
noise, such as double-curved saccades (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002). In the reported 
results, negative values on these measures indicate movement toward the emotional 
distractor and positive values represent movement away from it. Trials in which two 
neutral faces were presented were used as baseline. Mean values on these trials were 
subtracted from means on each type of emotion. 
To investigate if the results replicated findings in the literature, the data were 
subjected to individual Latency × Emotion ANOVAs for each measure; angle, 
maximum deviation, and quadratic coefficient. In addition, the influence of social 
anxiety levels of participants on emotional saccades was explored. In the current 
sample, mean SPIN-score = 19.1 (S.D. = 11.0). A suggested clinical cut-off score of 
19 (Connor et al., 2000) was used to group participants into Low-Socially Anxious 
(<19, N = 19) and High-Socially Anxious (≥ 19, N = 12) categories. These data were 
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explored with Social Anxiety × Latency × Emotion ANOVAs for each measures of 
saccade deviation.  
In order to investigate hyper-vigilance toward emotion in social anxiety, it was 
deemed interesting to explore the initial average saccade direction as well. Initial 
average deviation is derived from the deviation of each sample point in the first 10 
milliseconds of the saccade (Sheliga, Riggio, Craighero, & Rizzolatti, 1995; Sheliga, 
Riggio, & Rizzolatti, 1995). The initial saccades data were subjected to a Social 
Anxiety × Latency × Emotion ANOVA. 
 
 Results 
The Latency × Emotion ANOVAs yielded no significant main effects or 
interactions for angle. However, maximum deviation, curve area and quadratic 
coefficients all yielded significant main effects for latency (Figure 10a-d). Fast-onset 
saccades were made towards emotional faces, whereas the trajectory of slow-onset 
saccades curved away, see Table 2 for each measure individually. No valence effects 
(emotion main effects; ps ≥ .44; effect sizes: .005 ≤  ηp2 ≤ .027) or interactions 
between latency and emotion (ps ≥ .80; .003 ≤  ηp2 ≤ .008) were found. 
 
Table 2 
Latency main effects for each measure of saccade trajectory 
Measure 
Mean 
Difference 
(slow-fast) F(1, 30) p Effect size (ηp2) 
95% 
Confidence 
intervals of 
difference 
Angle -0.102 0.33 .573 .011 [-0.47 – 0.26]  
Maximum 
deviation 1.275 9.25 .005 .236 [0.41 – 2.12] 
Curve area 403.5 10.1 .003 .251 [114 – 663] 
Quadratic 
coefficient 2.185 6.73 .015 .183 [1.04 – 8.74] 
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Figure 10. Mean saccadic metrics on fast-onset saccades (bottom pairs of bars) and 
slow-onset saccades (top pairs of bars) relative to emotional faces. No valence effects 
were found, thus the results are collapsed across angry, disgusted and happy. Negative 
values indicate eye-movements toward the emotion, positive values away. A: Angle, 
B: maximum deviation, C: curve area, and D: quadratic coefficient. All metrics except 
angle yielded main effects for latency. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects 
standard error.  
 
Next, effects of social anxiety were explored using Social Anxiety × Latency 
× Emotion ANOVAs for each measure of saccade deviation. For saccade angle, no 
main effect of Social Anxiety was found; F(1, 29) = 2.75; p = .11, ηp2 = .087. There 
was a Social Anxiety × Latency × Emotion interaction-effect; F(2, 58) = 4.97, p = .01, 
ηp2 = .146. Independent t-tests for each emotion (angry, disgusted, happy) on each 
onset-latency (fast-onset, slow-onset) indicated that this interaction was driven by fast 
saccade behaviour on angry faces; t(29) = -2.62, p = .028; corrected for multiple 
  
 
80 
comparisons (all other ps ≥ .14). When participants low in social anxiety had a fast 
saccade reaction time, they looked toward angry faces (M = -0.40°, S.D. = 0.92), 
compared with those high in social anxiety who looked away (M = 0.48°, S.D. = 
0.91). This three-way interaction is illustrated in Figure 11.  
 
 
Figure 11. Mean saccade angle (º) of high socially anxious (HSA) and low socially 
anxious (LSA) participants on fast-onset saccades (bottom) and slow-onset saccades 
(top) relative to angry, happy and disgusted faces. Negative values indicate eye-
movements toward the emotion, positive values away. The significant Social Anxiety 
× Latency × Emotion was driven by angry faces on fast-onset saccades, from which 
high-socially anxious participants looked away. Low socially anxious participants 
looked toward angry faces on fast saccades. Other pairwise comparisons p ≥ .14. 
Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard error. 
 
For maximum deviation, there was a marginal main effect of social anxiety; 
F(1, 29) = 3.20, p = .084, ηp2 = .099; indicating that those low in social anxiety looked 
toward emotional faces (M = -0.43°, SE  = 0.44) and participants who scored above 
the cut-off looked away from emotional faces (M = 0.83°, SE  = 0.55). The direction 
of this main effect was replicated in the curve area and coefficient measures of 
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saccade deviation, but failed to reach significance (curve area: p = .10, ηp2 = .091; 
coefficient: p = .11, ηp2 = .087.). Other than the main effect for latency described 
above, none of the Social Anxiety × Latency × Emotion ANOVAs for maximum 
deviation, curve area, and coefficient revealed main effects for emotion or significant 
interactions (Social Anxiety X Emotion; Social Anxiety X Latency; Emotion X 
Latency). p-values ranged between .22 and .97; effect sizes ηp2 were between <.001 
and .050. The Social Anxiety X Emotion X Latency interaction that was found for 
angle, was not present in the measures of maximum deviation, curve area, and 
coefficient (.65 ≤ p ≤ .88; .004 ≤ ηp2 ≤ .015). 
 
 
Figure 12. Mean initial average deviation (º) of high socially anxious (HSA) and low 
socially anxious (LSA) participants on fast-onset saccades (bottom) and slow-onset 
saccades (top) relative to angry, happy and disgusted faces. Negative values indicate 
eye-movements toward the emotion, positive values away. High socially anxious 
participants initiated their gaze toward emotional faces relative to neutral faces. Low 
socially anxious participants initiated their saccades more straightforwardly through 
the centre of the screen. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard error. 
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Finally, the exploration of initial average saccade deviation was carried out. In 
the Social Anxiety × Latency × Emotion ANOVA there was a main effect of social 
anxiety on the direction of the initial average saccade deviation; F(1,29) = 7.38, p = 
.011, ηp2 = .203 (Figure 12). Whereas the low socially anxious group initiated their 
saccades straightforwardly through the centre of the screen, the high socially anxious 
participants initially diverted their gaze toward the emotional face (One-Sample t(11) 
from 0° = -2.73, p = .02). No other main effects or interactions for this analysis were 
significant; ps ≥ .10, ηp2s ≤ .078.9 
 
 Discussion 
 
4.4.1 Interpretation of results 
The aims of this study were, firstly, to investigate whether emotional 
information acts the same as salient distractors do in previous studies on saccade 
curvature, in which fast-onset saccades deviated toward salient distractors and slow-
onset saccades deviated away. In the current study, fast-onset saccades deviated 
toward emotional faces relative to neutral faces, whereas slow-onset saccades 
deviated away. This effect was consistent across different measures of saccade 
trajectory and provides evidence of the salient nature of emotional expressions. 
Secondly, this study explored whether saccade curvature was modulated by social 
anxiety. There was some evidence that this is the case.  
                                                
 
9 These values were found for the Latency × Emotion interaction, but its follow-up 
comparisons yielded no significant results. All other effects; ps ≥ .24, ηp2s ≤ .049. 
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Overall, the findings suggest that fast saccades deviate towards emotional 
faces, whereas saccades that have a slower onset deviate away from emotional 
distractors. This is in line with findings from salient distractors in visual search tasks 
with eye-tracking (Van Zoest & Donk, 2006) and with studies investigating the 
influence of task-irrelevant social or emotional distractors on saccadic curvature 
(Petrova & Wentura, 2012; Laidlaw et al., 2015; McSorley & Van Reekum, 2013; 
Schmidt et al., 2012). Furthermore, previous studies used paradigms where fast-onset 
and slow-onset saccades were decided by task demands. In other words, in overlap-
conditions measuring fast-onset saccades, distractor items appeared before the 
saccade target was presented and in gap conditions measuring slow-onset saccades, 
the target appeared after the distractors were presented. The current study appears to 
be the first one in the literature using emotional faces as task-irrelevant distractors, as 
well as employing a paradigm in which target and distractors appeared 
simultaneously, allowing for a look at individual SOAs. Therefore, the confirmation 
of findings from previous studies provides a basis on which to investigate saccade 
modulation by individual differences such as, in the present case, social anxiety. 
Nevertheless, in the current experiments, the overall saccade trajectory was 
not convincingly related to social anxiety but numerical differences indicate that those 
high in social anxiety may avoid emotional faces more than those with low social 
anxiety. All measures; angle, maximum deviation, curve area, and quadratic 
coefficient, indicated that participants who were high in social anxiety looked away 
from emotional faces, whereas those low in social anxiety, looked toward emotional 
faces, irrespective of valence or latency (note that these did not reach statistical 
significance).  
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Additionally, the three-way interaction effect of social anxiety X latency X 
emotion on angle revealed that fast-onset saccades differed between low- socially 
anxious and high-socially anxious participants when an angry face serves as a 
distractor. When low socially anxious participants generated fast-onset saccades 
during the presence of an angry face, their response was similar than to fast-onset 
saccades for other emotional faces: they tended to deviate toward the emotional 
expression. On the other hand, high socially anxious participants showed a different 
saccade angle for fast-onset saccades during the presence of an angry face relative to 
low-socially anxious participants as well as relative to their fast-onset saccades for 
other emotions: they deviated away from angry faces.  
These results suggest that top-down driven avoidance of threat may be 
accelerated in socially anxious individuals. However, it is important to note that this 
interaction was not replicated across the other curvature measures. Furthermore, the 
difference was only .88° and angle is only an indication of landing position, not the 
complete trajectory. This result should therefore be interpreted with caution. 
 Finally, exploratory analyses with initial average deviation elicited a strong 
group effect. High socially anxious participants initially showed saccades toward 
emotions, regardless of latency. Low socially anxious participants initiated their eye 
movements more vertically. This effect is interesting in light of the marginal social 
anxiety main effects on the overall saccade measures, where those high in social 
anxiety appeared to look away from emotional faces. Firstly, as the high socially 
anxious initially shifted toward the emotion, this could potentially explain why their 
overall effect of looking away failed to reach significance. But moreover, this fits in 
with hyper-vigilance/avoidance theories of attentional biases in anxiety (Wieser et al., 
2009). For example, dot-probe paradigms have often shown stronger evidence for 
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early vigilance than late avoidance (e.g. Miskovic & Schmidt, 2012). Furthermore, 
most tasks of visual attention with threatening faces engage perceptual processes in 
socially anxious individuals mostly when exposure times are short (Staugaard, 2010). 
Nevertheless, the reliability of initial deviations is unknown (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 
2002), but this finding is interesting considering the currently reported strong findings 
for hyper-vigilance compared to the weak trend of social anxiety related avoidance. 
 
4.4.2 Limitations and implications 
 Patterns of social-anxiety related facilitated orienting toward threat followed 
by avoidance remain unclear. One potential explanation of the findings presented 
above is that the deviation away from emotion seen in higher social anxiety failed to 
reach a large effect size because the initial deviation in high socially anxious 
participants was always toward the emotion regardless of saccade onset. On the other 
hand, low-socially anxious participants’ direction of initial deviation matched the 
direction of the other deviation measures: fast-onset saccades deviated toward 
emotional distractors and slow-onset saccades deviated away. In other words, social 
anxiety may be characterised by a bottom-up mechanism of emotionally relevant 
information drawing attention. When this is then followed by avoidance, this top-
down mechanism may not be able to correct the trajectory enough to yield larger 
differences. A study with more power, or a higher number of trials specifically, will 
lead to more insight into the potentially dual attentional mechanism at play.  
 The attentional capture of emotional faces also appears to be driven by 
stimulus properties and experimental design. For example, in McSorley and Van 
Reekum (2013), the distractor images were larger and closer to the path between cue 
and target than in the present study. A pilot version of the study presented in this 
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chapter used smaller images that were more peripherally located on the screen, and 
the currently presented systematic pattern of deviation toward emotion for fast-onset 
saccades and away from emotion for slow-onset saccades was not found in this pilot 
study. This indicates that emotional information will engage the perceptual system 
more when it is more salient as well as more central to the visual field. Ideally, a 
follow-up study should adjust the present design to further examine this notion. 
 
4.4.3 Conclusion 
 The present chapter presented a unique saccadic curvature paradigm using 
emotional faces as distractors, whilst the variable of saccade onset time was 
calculated for each individual. It was found that emotional expressions act as salient 
information on the oculomotor system. Stimulus properties draw fast-onset saccades 
toward emotional faces, whereas top-down control drives slow-onset saccades away. 
Additionally, this curvature may be modulated by social anxiety, which is potentially 
manifested in attentional avoidance of threat following initial orienting toward the 
emotional stimulus. Taken together, this paradigm has the potential to be applied to 
future attention bias research. 
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5 The ssVEP response to emotional expressions in social 
anxiety is task-dependent 
The previous experimental chapters presented behavioural experiments that 
investigated attention toward emotional faces in social anxiety. This chapter 
investigates this same topic by measuring brain activity during emotional attention. 
Recently, a promising novel methodological approach to examining face processing 
has been developed: steady state Visual-Evoked Potentials (ssVEP). When stimuli are 
presented at a fixed rate, neurons in the visual cortex fire at the same frequency of the 
periodic visual stimulation. The power or amplitude of the activity at this frequency is 
called the ssVEP. Akin to adaptation, ssVEP power decreases over time, indicating 
that attention ceases to remain captured. This chapter explores ssVEP power in 
response to different emotional expressions under different task-demands and 
examines the effects of social anxiety. There were two tasks: first participants were 
responding to changes in identity of the stimulus and second, they were looking for 
changes in emotion. It was found that a) each emotion yielded a different ssVEP 
magnitude, and b) there was a potential interaction between task-type and social 
anxiety. Those with low social anxiety displayed larger ssVEP activity during identity 
decisions than emotion decisions, whereas those high in social anxiety showed an 
increase in ssVEP activity during the emotion-task relative to the identity task. In 
other words, neural differences between the groups are dependent on what 
individuals are directed to pay attention to. This may indicate that differential 
attentional captivation by social information in social anxiety is driven by top-down 
states of attention. 
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 Background and Rationale 
 
5.1.1 EEG and emotional processing 
Electroencephalography (EEG) can be used to investigate neural activity 
toward emotional expressions as a measure of preferential attentional processing. One 
way to do this is by examining Event-Related Potentials (ERPs). For example, one 
ERP study found that, compared with participants low in trait anxiety, highly anxious 
participants detected deviant faces in an oddball paradigm faster than non-anxious 
participants, as reflected by an earlier P3 component; but showed more difficulty in 
processing the emotional content of the face, as reflected by a decrease N300 
component (Rossignol, Philippot, Douilliez, Crommelinck, & Campanella, 2005).  
A different approach to using EEG to explore the mechanisms that underpin 
face processing, is through examination of neural adaptation, which is also referred to 
as repetition suppression or habituation (Rossion & Boremanse, 2011). Neural 
adaptation refers to reduced activation when the same stimulus is repeatedly presented 
(Grill-Spector et al., 2006; Kovács et al, 2006). However, neural adaptation studies 
are methodologically challenging. Most importantly, effects of neural adaptation are 
small, resulting in the need of a large number of participants and trials (Rossion & 
Boremanse, 2011). Recently, a new method without these limitations has been 
developed: the steady-state Visual-Evoked Potential (ssVEP; see Rossion (2014) for a 
review). 
 
5.1.2 The steady-state Visual-Evoked Potential (ssVEP) 
When a stimulus is repeatedly presented at a fixed rate it generates a periodic 
change in voltage amplitude of occipital activation measured by EEG (Rossion, 
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2014). The advantage of the neuronal firing at the rate of this periodic visual 
stimulation lies in the fact that the stimulus frequency determines the response 
frequency. This yields a specific peak activity at the frequency of interest after 
applying a Fast Fourier Transformation to the EEG recording, which in turn allows 
for precise evaluation of a stimulus effect (Wieser, McTeague, & Keil, 2011). This 
technique was originally employed to investigate low-level visual features (e.g. 
Regan, 1966). However, recently ssVEP studies into face perception have been 
conducted (Rossion, 2014). In one of the first studies it was found that repetition of 
identical faces leads to a reduction of the ssVEP response compared with presentation 
of different faces, which indicates that the ssVEP response is akin to neural adaptation 
(Rossion & Boremanse, 2011; Gerlicher, Van Loon, Scholte, Lamme, & Van Der 
Leij, 2013). 
An additional advantage of the ssVEP technique is that it requires relatively 
short experimental sessions. As the stimuli are presented in rapid succession, 
experimental duration is typically shorter than in ERP studies, making the ssVEP 
technique more efficient than methodologies such as typical neural adaptation studies 
(Rossion, Alonso-Prieto, Boremanse, Kuefner, & Van Belle, 2012). 
Utilising ssVEP to study facial perception has only recently been employed, 
and has mostly focused on facial identity processing rather than investigating effects 
of emotional expressions. A number of interesting findings have nonetheless been 
presented in the literature. Most predominately, it has been found that larger ssVEP 
responses are elicited by novel/changing faces compared with the presentation of 
familiar/repeated faces (Alonso-Prieto, Van Belle, Liu-Shuang, Norcia, & Rossion, 
2009; Rossion, 2014). A decreased effect was also found for inverted faces, reverse-
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contrasted faces, and a combination of both (Rossion et al., 2012), indicating that the 
technique can be employed to study face-specific processing. 
There are indications that the ssVEP technique can also be used to investigate 
emotion-specific effects. Gerlicher et al. (2013) presented identical and different faces 
with neutral, happy, fearful, or mixed (i.e. each face was either angry, contemptuous, 
disgusted, sad, or surprised) expressions. They found reduced adaptation for 
emotional stimuli compared with neutral expressions, indicating that emotional 
information receives preferential processing in the visual cortex. It should be noted 
that their control condition involved different and constantly varying emotional 
expressions relative to the conditions of interest. Therefore, it remains inconclusive if 
direct effects of emotion were measured. 
The current thesis investigates attentional modulation toward emotional 
expressions in social anxiety. Interestingly, it is suggested that ssVEPs elicited by 
emotional faces may be modulated by social anxiety (Wieser et al., 2011; Wieser, 
McTeague, & Keil, 2012). One study investigated emotion-elicited ssVEPs in pre-
screened high versus low social anxiety groups and found high socially anxious 
participants displayed larger ssVEPs than those low in social anxiety for emotional 
(happy, fearful, and angry) compared with neutral faces (McTeague, Shumen, Wieser, 
Lang, & Keil, 2011). This provides initial evidence that socially anxious individuals 
display an atypical neural response to emotional expressions.  
The ssVEP studies described above did not require directed attention toward 
the emotion displayed. For example, in the study by Gerlicher et al. (2013), 
participants were required to respond to a brief colour change of the fixation cross that 
was superimposed between the eyes of the face. However, rather than neural fatigue, 
adaptation can also be a consequence of top-down modulation toward the stimuli 
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(Ewbank et al., 2011; Ewbank, Henson, Rowe, Stoyanova, & Calder, 2013). In other 
words, it may be driven by prior beliefs, or perceptual expectation (Ewbank, von dem 
Hagen, Powell, Henson, & Calder, 2016). Furthermore, in face processing visual 
areas, activation evoked by facial expressions occurs in addition to activation evoked 
by attention (Vuilleumier, Armony, Driver, & Dolan, 2001). The role of this top-
down control in adaptation can be manipulated by varying the task-demands 
modulating the participant’s attentional set. For example, the Attentional Blink 
chapter in this thesis found social anxiety-related effects when attention toward 
emotional expressions was required for the task, but not when it was implicit.  
 
5.1.3 The current experiment 
Altogether, the ssVEP technique provides an interesting and novel approach 
for studying attention toward emotional expressions in social anxiety. Previous 
studies have found a reliable adaptation effect by comparing ssVEP responses on 
multiple cycles with an identical face with the baseline of a different face per each 
cycle. This notion justifies removing the different face per cycle-baseline and instead 
comparing effects of different emotional expressions which are presented in identical 
repetition, i.e. a succession of cycles using the same face. This allows for a direct 
comparison of the ssVEP response for blocks of angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, and 
neutral faces during a relatively short experimental session. 
Furthermore, whereas ssVEP studies in face perception have employed 
stimulus presentation frequencies between 3Hz and 17.5 Hz (Rossion, 2014), it has 
recently been suggested that the largest ssVEP responses to facial different versus 
identical faces are elicited at a presentation rate of 5.88Hz (Alonso-Prieto et al., 
2013). One cycle at this frequency lasts 170ms, which interestingly matches the face-
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sensitive N170 ERP component (Bentin, Allison, Puce, Perez, & McCarthy, 1996). 
This offers a practical implication for paradigm optimization. Therefore, faces in this 
experiment will be presented at a rate of 5.88 cycles per second. 
Finally, to examine the role of top-down attention toward emotional 
information in the environment, in the present study emotional relevance of the 
stimuli was modulated by task demands. Previous experiments, such as Gerlicher et 
al. (2013) used a more ‘passive viewing’ design, in which stimulus content was not 
made directly relevant to the participants’ direction of attention. The current 
experiment has two tasks. Participants are asked to either respond to changes in 
identity of the stimulus, or to changes in emotion of the stimulus. So far, this thesis 
has demonstrated that social anxiety-related attention bias might be modulated by 
task-characteristics, especially related to the relevance of the emotional face. For 
example, the Attentional Blink experiments in chapter 2 revealed that social anxiety-
related effects only surfaced when identifying the emotion of the target was directly 
required for the task, but not when the emotion was not task-relevant. In the saccadic 
curvature experiment (chapter 4), where emotional faces appeared as task-irrelevant 
distractors, less convincing social anxiety-related effects were found. Therefore, it is 
predicted that individuals high in social anxiety will show less adaptation to emotional 
stimuli than low-socially anxious individuals when they are specifically attending to 
emotional information.  
In sum, the following is hypothesised. 1) At the presentation frequency of 
5.88, the angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, and neutral faces will evoke different 
amplitudes on occipital sites, with no specific prediction made about the direction of 
this effect or any influence of trait social anxiety therein. 2) When emotional 
expressions are task-relevant (i.e. when participants are asked to pay attention to 
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changes in emotion of the face), high-socially anxious participants will show a larger 
ssVEP amplitude than low-socially anxious participants, which would indicate less 
adaptation. However, when emotion is not task-relevant, i.e. participants are asked to 
pay attention to changes in identity of the face, and not emotional expression thereof, 
no group differences in ssVEP amplitude are expected. 
 
 Method 
 
5.2.1 Participants 
33 right-handed participants took part in the study part in exchange for a 
payment of £10, of which 3 were excluded because of noisy data and/or too many 
artefacts (N = 30; 8 male, mean age = 22.7; S.D. = 3.57). All participants self-reported 
normal or corrected-to-normal vision. Further exclusion criteria were having a history 
of psychiatric or neurological disorders, migraines, epilepsy, consumption of 
psychoactive substances or medication, or loss of consciousness for more than five 
minutes. 
 
5.2.2 Materials 
Social Anxiety. The Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000) was 
used as a self-report measure of social anxiety (see Appendix A). Mean score in the 
current sample was 22.1 (S.D. = 12.1). Using the same cut-off score of 19 as in the 
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previous experiments in this chapter, 13 participants were classified as low-social 
anxiety and 17 participants were classified as high-social anxiety.10 
Stimuli. From 5 Caucasian male identities, selected from the Radboud Faces 
Database (RaFD; Langner et al., 2010), angry, disgusted, fearful, happy and neutral 
emotional expressions were selected. Anything outside the face area, such as 
background, was cropped from the stimuli to blend in with the grey background of the 
screen and images were resized to 560 x 560 pixels. These images were matched for 
luminance and presented in greyscale. The experiment was programmed in PsychoPy 
(Peirce, 2007; 2009). 
EEG recording. EEG recordings were acquired with a 64-electrode 
BrainVision cap (Brain Products) with standard 10/20 layout. Electrode FT9 was 
attached to the left cheekbone to record eye-movements such as blinking. The ground 
and reference electrodes were in positions AFz and FCz respectively. The electrodes 
were fed through BrainAmp 64 Plus amplifiers and the signal was recorded with 
Brain Vision Recorder using a temporal resolution of 1,000Hz.  
 
5.2.3 Procedure 
EEG recordings took place in a lit room. Participants were sat at a distance of 
approximately 110cm from a 53 x 30cm screen with 60Hz refresh rate. After 
providing informed consent, participants were fitted with the cap and electrodes. 
                                                
 
10 Autistic traits were also recorded, using the Autism Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, 
Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin, & Clubley, 2001). However, the relation between autistic traits 
and emotional face processing is beyond the scope of the study presented herein. 
  
 
95 
Impedance was held below 25kOhm and when noise levels were satisfactory, 
participants received task instructions before the experiment commenced.11  
For each participant, a unique list of stimulus presentation order was 
constructed in python, using conditional randomization. In other words, the first 
stimulus was randomly selected, after which each subsequent face had to be either the 
same identity or the same emotional expression as the preceding face, until all 25 
stimuli were used. 
Each face was presented on the screen with sinusoidally increasing and 
decreasing contrast at a rate of 5.88Hz. At each presentation cycle, the face was 
presented at a random size between 85% and 115% of the original image size to avoid 
adaptation to low-level features (Boremanse, Palmero-Soler, Jacob, & Rossion, 2010; 
Rossion, 2014; Xu, Tanaka, & Rossion, 2013). After a trial of 35 cycles (about 6s) of 
the same face, a new face was presented with either the same identity but a different 
emotional expression, or with a different identity but the same emotional expression 
until all of the 25 faces were presented in the experimental block. One block therefore 
lasted approximately 150s. This procedure was then repeated for task 2. 
During task 1, participants were instructed to press the spacebar if they noticed 
a change in identity and to ignore changes in emotional expression. However, for task 
2, this was reversed: participants were instructed to press the spacebar when they saw 
a change in emotional expression, but were asked to ignore changes in identity of the 
stimulus. The order of these tasks was counterbalanced between participants. 
 
                                                
 
11 The experiment described herein was preceded by another experimental task in support of 
an MSc-thesis. Consequently, it is beyond the scope of the current chapter. 
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5.2.4 Design and Analysis 
Emotions across different identities were collated, resulting into segments for 
angry, disgusted, fearful and happy faces. Consequently, this study follows a 2 (SPIN; 
low anxious, high anxious) × 2 (Task; identity-attention, emotion-attention) × 5 
(Emotion; angry, disgusted, fearful, happy, neutral) mixed design, with SPIN-score as 
a between subject variable and task and emotion as repeated measures variables.  
The EEG data was processed in Brain-Vision Analyzer. After an ocular 
correction was applied, the EEG signal was referenced to a common average 
reference. The data was then filtered between 0.1 and 100 Hz (Butterworth filter, 24 
dB/oct slope). Segments with artifacts in the posterior channels were removed. Data 
was selected from a 143-s window of stimulation starting 6-s after the beginning of 
stimulation (i.e. all blocks minus the first). This was done to avoid contamination 
from responses triggered by the onset of stimulation, to allow some time for the 
neurons to be entrained (Rossion & Boremanse, 2011), and for the steady-state 
response to establish (Rossion, 2014). A Fast Fourier Transformation (FFT) algorithm 
was applied to each emotional block; from which the highest average amplitude in the 
four 5.88 Hz surrounding bins per participant for each emotion was calculated 
(resolution was 0.12 Hz, resulting in extraction bins of 5.74 Hz, 5.86 Hz, 5.98 Hz, and 
6.10 Hz). Typically, ssVEP activity for centrally presented stimuli is most pronounced 
on the occipital pole, centered around the Oz-electrode (Müller, Andersen, & Keil, 
2008). Therefore, following McTeague et al. (2011), analyses in the current report are 
run on activity measured at Oz. Other studies, such as Gerlicher et al. (2013), chose to 
analyse a cluster of parietal-occipital channels. In these clusters the Oz is always 
included too. The statistical analyses were performed in IBM SPSS Statistics version 
22 over log-transformed data (base-10) to meet assumptions of normality.  
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 Results 
A clear ssVEP peak was established around the 5.88Hz frequency, see Figure 
13, which displays Grand Average activity across all conditions and all participants. 
Activity peaks were also found on the second and third harmonics, replicating typical 
ssVEP responses in the literature (e.g. Rossion, 2014). 
 
 
Figure 13. Grand Average frequency power across all trials and participants. Note the 
peak activity around the presentation rate of 5.88Hz as well as in the second and third 
harmonics. 
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A main effect of emotion was found, F(4, 112) = 7.27, p < .001, ηp2 = .204. 
Pairwise comparisons (Bonferroni-corrected) yielded significant differences between 
angry-disgusted (p = .040), angry-happy faces (p < .001), and happy-neutral faces (p 
= .003). The difference between fearful and happy faces is only marginally significant 
at p = .065; see Figure 14. Numerically, the largest adaptation appears to occur for 
angry faces, respectively followed by neutral, fearful, disgusted and happy, for which 
ssVEP amplitude remains highest. 
 
 
Figure 14. Oz ssVEP amplitude (log-10 µV) for the identity-task (left) and emotion-
task (right) per emotion of the stimulus for both anxiety groups. There was a main 
effect for emotion on ssVEP amplitude. Specifically: angry < happy (p < .001), angry 
< disgusted (p = .040), and neutral < happy (p = .003). There was also a near 
significant two-way interaction between social anxiety and task-type: ssVEP 
amplitude for the high socially anxious participants was larger in the emotion-task 
relative to the identity-task; as well as relative to low socially anxious participants’ 
ssVEP amplitude across both tasks. Error bars represent +/- 1 within-subjects standard 
error. 
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Neither a main effect for task-type or a between-subjects main effect of social 
anxiety were found; ps > .90, ηp2s ≤ .001. However, there was a marginally significant 
Task × Social Anxiety interaction effect, F(1, 28) = 3.25, p = .08, ηp2 = .104. No other 
interactions were statistically significant (lowest p = .68; largest ηp2 =020). Figure 14 
suggests that, during task 1, where participants paid attention to changes in identity, 
both groups had ssVEPs of similar magnitude. However, when participants paid 
attention to changes in emotion, ssVEP amplitude decreased for the low-social 
anxiety group, whereas it increased for those high in social anxiety, relative to the 
identity task. However, follow-up analysis of SPIN group differences per individual 
task-type yielded no statistically significant results (identity-task p = .87; emotion-
task p = .68). In addition, follow up analyses per group yielded no statistically 
significant difference for task-type in the low anxiety group (p = .32) and in the high-
social anxiety group (p = .13) but the high social anxiety group shows a larger effect 
size for task type (ηp2 = .139) than the low-social anxiety group (ηp2 = .082) 12.  
In order to further investigate this effect, a similar analysis was run. A 
repeated measures GLM with mean-centered SPIN score demonstrated a significant 
Task × Social anxiety interaction effect; F(1, 28) = 4.38, p = .045, ηp2 = .135. This is 
illustrated by contrasting the tasks (subtracting ssVEP log-10 amplitude during the 
identity-task from the emotion-task), which yielded a significant correlation between 
SPIN-score and ssVEP amplitude, r = .37, p = .045, see Figure 15. 
                                                
 
12 Results similar to the ones reported here, were found in a median-split SPIN-score analysis 
with slightly larger effect sizes overall; e.g. Social Anxiety × Task F(1, 28) = 3.39,  p = .08, 
ηp2 = .108. Similarly, paired sampled t-tests showed no differences in task-type for the low 
socially anxious group. For the high socially anxious group, p = .09 (two-tailed). 
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Figure 15. Scatterplot of participants' SPIN-scores on the x-axis and task-contrasted 
ssVEP peak activity on the y-axis. Higher values on the y-axis indicate more activity 
during the emotion-task compared with the identity-task. Note: trendline r = .37, p 
< .05. 
 
 Discussion 
 
5.4.1 Is social anxiety-related attention toward emotion task-dependent? 
The key interest to the current study was social anxiety-related differences in 
ssVEP amplitude. It was hypothesised that individuals high in social anxiety would 
show less adaptation to emotional stimuli than low-socially anxious individuals when 
they are specifically attending to emotional information. The results provide some 
support for this prediction. When SPIN group was examined, a marginally significant 
interaction between social anxiety and task-type was found. Follow-up analyses 
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yielded numerical differences between tasks/groups that support the hypothesis but 
these were not statistically significant. When SPIN score was treated continuously 
however, the interaction between anxiety and task type was significant and follow-up 
analyses showed that the higher the individual’s social anxiety, the larger the ssVEP 
response was in the emotion-task relative to the identity-task. To explore how robust 
this effect was, additional exploratory analyses were conducted using raw amplitude 
(rather than Log-10 transformed), splitting social-anxiety scores into groups in 
different ways (e.g. median split), using neighbouring electrodes, and exploring 
correlations, and all supported this conclusion. Consequently, these results were not 
likely to be solely subject to chance and there is a reasonable foundation for 
interpretation. 
Overall, the finding that the attentional set modulates ssVEP amplitude 
differently for high-socially anxious individuals than for low-socially anxious 
individuals, suggests that there is a role of top-down processes in social anxiety-
related attention bias. This role is highlighted in attentional control theory, especially 
regarding the anxiety-related impairment of attentional control, which is involved in 
inhibiting attention to task-irrelevant stimuli (Derakshan & Eysenck, 2009). This top-
down control of incoming stimuli is thought to be competing with a pre-attentive 
threat evaluation mechanism in anxiety (Mathews & Mackintosh, 1998). From these 
accounts it could be derived that in the emotion-task, the high-socially anxious 
participants need to constantly suppress the effect of incoming emotional information 
in their threat evaluation mechanism to carry out the task-demands of indicating 
emotional changes, thus they show reduced adaptation for these stimuli. However, 
from the current experiment, it cannot be concluded whether a task-driven alertness 
toward emotion evoked the larger ssVEP response in the emotion-task, or whether 
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inhibition of irrelevant emotional processing led to relatively more neural adaptation 
in the identity task.  
It is noteworthy that no interaction between social anxiety and valence was 
found, which does not confirm some previous findings that attentional biases in social 
anxiety are specifically related to threat (Mogg & Bradley, 1998; Rossignol et al., 
2005; Staugaard, 2010). However, attentional bias research in anxiety has not always 
revealed effects of valence, or threat specifically, and there could be a general bias for 
faces in anxiety. In generalised anxiety disorder for example, a bias for happy faces 
potentially coexists along a bias for threat faces (Bradley, Mogg, White, Groom & De 
Bono, 1999). This could indicate that socially anxious individuals are hypervigilant in 
scanning the environment for affective, or arousing, information rather than threat 
specifically or indeed that all social cues represent potential threat for a socially 
anxious individual. In another instance, a cueing paradigm with emotional faces, 
valence only affected response time, but not accuracy in socially anxious individuals 
(Fox, Russo, & Dutton, 2002). However, the time-course of hypervigilance and 
avoidance was not investigated with the paradigm presented here. Nevertheless taken 
together, this experiment provides further evidence that hyper-vigilance toward 
emotion is potentially modulated by task demands and, consequently, top-down 
control. 
 
5.4.2 Neural adaptation toward different emotions 
A secondary aim of the current experiment was quantifying neural steady-state 
responses to different emotions. Whilst a large main effect of emotion was found, 
follow-up analyses yielded curious results. Remarkably, most adaptation was found 
for angry faces, followed in order of most to least adaptation by neutral, fearful, 
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disgusted, and happy faces. Only differences between angry-disgusted, angry-happy 
and happy-neutral were statistically significant.  
Interpreting results for neutral faces presents a challenge for a number of 
reasons. First, they are not as ecologically valid as the emotional faces as neutral faces 
are not often experienced in real life. Second, neutral faces are open to interpretation 
and are often interpreted negatively. Third, response to neutral faces typically yields 
large inter-individual variance, perhaps as a result of being open to interpretation 
(Donegan et al., 2003; Lee, Kang, Park, Kim, & An, 2008; Somerville, Kim, 
Johnstone, Alexander, & Whalen, 2004). If we disregard neutral, one could argue for 
a valence effect: the ssVEP response decreases from happy to angry faces. However, 
the direction of this effect is in stark contrast with the literature. It has previously been 
found that ssVEP responses were larger for fearful than for happy faces (Gerlicher et 
al., 2013). However, Gerlicher and colleagues used changing identities in each cycle, 
with fearful faces as a negative condition. Other negative expressions were part of a 
‘mixed’ category. Consequently, the researchers were interested to neural adaptation 
to identity modulated by emotional expressions. The current study used longer single-
identity, single-emotion blocks across four different emotional expressions, in order to 
purely investigate adaptation to emotion. It is possible that these differences in 
paradigm characteristics play a role in ssVEP response to different emotions. 
In addition, the reduced ssVEP amplitude for angry faces possibly makes 
sense from an emotion regulation point of view. Research suggests that low ssVEP 
responses may be a sign of neural adaptation, but also higher level processing 
(Rossion, 2014). This is built on the notion that neural adaptation itself can also be a 
consequence of top-down modulation toward the stimuli (Ewbank et al., 2011; 2013). 
Perhaps threatening stimuli were not adapted to, but a top-down process of emotion 
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perception served to conserve neural activity to facilitate an immediate and effective 
response in the next stage of perceptual processing (Bar, 2003), such as a fight-or-
flight response. In sum, a low ssVEP response in repeated emotional identities may be 
indicative of graduation into deeper levels of processing. However, future research is 
needed to establish whether the ssVEP response investigate here is related to neural 
adaptation characterised by neural fatigue or by depth of processing.  
 
5.4.3 Limitations 
A few methodological limitations exist in the current experiment. Firstly, it 
relied heavily on previous studies having employed same-versus-different face 
conditions. These studies (e.g. Gerlicher at al., 2013; Rossion & Boremanse, 2011) 
measured adaptation to identical faces in each cycle compared with different faces in 
each cycle. As high and narrow ssVEP responses were found consistently, it was 
thought that the paradigm could be taken beyond the different-face baseline condition. 
It could have been valuable to include a different-face condition as well. Participants’ 
responses may be driven by expectations rather than mere observation (Rossion, 
2014). In addition, a different-face condition would have provided an individual 
baseline for each participant. An additional consideration is that the data was log-10 
transformed to meet assumptions of normality. Despite the raw data displaying the 
same numerical effects, the statistical results may have been skewed by the presence 
of peak amplitudes between 0 and 1 µV. Caution is required when applying 
logarithmic transformations to these values, as they result in negative values 
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(Osborne, 2005). However, adding an arbitrary constant is not recommended (Feng et 
al., 2014)13.  
A final limitation is that of presentation rate. A frequency of 5.88Hz was used, 
based on previous observations that it evokes large ssVEP amplitudes for face 
perception, potentially matching the N170 ERP face component (Alonso-Prieto et al., 
2013; Nemrodov, Jacques, & Rossion, 2015; Rossion, 2014). However, recently 
published research suggested that, while 5.88 might be ideal for face identity 
processing, it could be moderately slower for emotional processing (Zhu, Alonso-
Prieto, Handy, & Barton, 2016). More specifically, a presentation of different 
emotional expressions yielded the largest ssVEP response at 5Hz. It is interesting to 
note that this in turn potentially matched the P200 ERP component, which is a frontal 
component thought to be related to emotional processing (Ashley, Vuilleumier, & 
Swick, 2004). Whereas Gerlicher et al. (2013) found valence effects with an even 
slower presentation rate of 3Hz, perhaps adaptation to different emotional 
expressions, including social anxiety-related atypical processing, could be better 
differentiated by employing a paradigm with slower presentation rates. 
 
5.4.4 Conclusion 
A reliable ssVEP peak amplitude for faces was found on both tasks at a 
periodic presentation rate of 5.88 Hz, indicated by a narrow peak at this frequency in 
the spectrum, including the 2nd and 3rd harmonic. In addition, this peak was 
established during a relatively short presentation time per block (6s) compared with 
                                                
 
13 Preliminary analysis of Log10(x+1) data indicated a replication of the presented findings, 
but the data was not normally distributed. 
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the literature (10-15s). There was a strong main effect of emotion, with angry faces 
evoking the lowest amplitude and happy faces the highest. Furthermore, an effect of 
social anxiety was found; high-socially anxious participants showed an increased 
ssVEP response when they were explicitly paying attention to emotional cues rather 
than to identity cues relative to low-socially anxious participants. This provides some 
support that top-down processes may play a role in social anxiety-related hyper-
vigilance toward threat. 
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6 General Discussion 
 
The aims of this thesis were to explore a) attentional bias in social anxiety 
using b) novel experimental paradigms. The specific focus was on proposed anxiety-
related attention bias components of facilitated orienting toward threat, difficulty in 
attentional disengagement from threat, and attentional avoidance. A review of the 
existing literature suggested that traditional paradigms such as the dot-probe task 
may not be suitable to disentangle these early and late components. To overcome the 
limitations of these designs, novel approaches to social-anxiety related attention bias 
were proposed, using emotional faces as stimuli: an emotional adaptation of the 
attentional blink in adults as well as child participants, saccadic curvature of 
recorded eye-movements, and ssVEP responses in the EEG signal. Potentially as a 
result of the exploratory nature of these designs, findings in regards to bias 
components were inconclusive. Moreover, it appeared that the attentional set of 
participants, modulated by task demands affected conclusions: overall, social-anxiety 
related differences in emotional face processes depended on whether participants had 
to actively pay attention to emotional information. In this general discussion, the 
results from the experimental chapters will be brought together, offering a reflective 
account of the presented research.  
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 Aims and findings 
 
6.1.1 Aims  
The literature review (chapter 1) introduced potential mechanisms 
underpinning anxiety-related attention bias, discussing theories including the 
hypervigilance-avoidance hypothesis (e.g. Bögels & Mansell, 2004), and the 
components of facilitated orienting, delayed disengagement, and attentional avoidance 
(Cisler & Koster, 2010). Together, the evidence for these models in anxiety and the 
gap in the literature regarding social anxiety specifically influenced the decision to 
study the underpinnings of attentional bias in social anxiety. 
Additionally, methods typically used to investigate these mechanisms were 
reviewed; most prominently, visual search, the emotional stroop, spatial cueing, and 
the dot-probe tasks (Bar-Haim et al., 2007). One limitation of these tasks was that 
they mostly examine attention bias in the spatial domain, with relatively little focus on 
the temporal domain. Furthermore, there have been sensible invitations to study 
attentional mechanisms using eyetracking (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012) and EEG 
(Gerlicher et al., 2013; Rossion, 2014). 
Taken together, the aims of this thesis were founded on the mechanisms of 
attentional bias, as much as driven by the methodological challenges of assessing 
attentional biases and teasing apart the components of bias. Specifically, the aims of 
this thesis can be summarised in the following questions. 
A) Is attention bias for emotional faces in social anxiety underpinned 
by: a) facilitated orienting toward threat; b) delayed disengagement 
and/or difficulties disengaging attention away from threat; c) 
attentional avoidance of threat? 
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B) Are there techniques and experiments available beyond those 
typically used which would allow for a closer investigation into 
these components of attention bias? 
Firstly, an overview of the results from each chapter will be provided. 
Secondly, these results will be brought together under three central themes: bias 
components, methods, and attentional set. The chapter ends with a reflective account 
of limitations, directions and implications as well as a final conclusion. 
 
6.1.2 Results overview 
This thesis presented four experimental chapters and each of these 
experiments used faces as stimuli. The first experiments were comprised of 
adaptations of the attentional blink paradigms, including a version for and with child 
participants in a separate chapter. To explore attention bias by recording eye-
movements, a saccade curvature experiment was developed. Finally, an ssVEP 
paradigm was designed to explore whether social anxiety-related biases would 
manifest in differential neural activation. A summary of findings per chapter follows. 
 Chapter 2: Attentional Blink Adults. In this chapter, three adaptations of the 
attentional blink paradigm using animals as neutral targets and happy/disgusted faces 
as emotional targets were presented among a stream of scrambled faces as distractor 
items. When T1 was an emotional face and T2 an animal, only a main effect of lag 
was found. However, a surprising finding was revealed: T1 (face) analysis suggested 
that low socially-anxious participants identified happy faces less accurately than they 
did disgusted faces and less accurately than high-socially anxious participants 
identified both happy and disgusted faces. 
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Experiment 2 in this chapter followed a similar paradigm, except target order 
was switched. This time, T1 was an animal and T2 a face. A three-way interaction 
between social anxiety, emotion, and lag was present, but the results were in a 
surprising direction. At lag-1, when T2 follows T1 most closely, participants high in 
social anxiety performed equally well on both disgusted and happy faces. On 
disgusted faces, low socially anxious participants performed similarly, but they were 
less accurate for happy faces. 
For experiment three, the paradigm with an animal T1 and face T2 was 
adjusted: it was made more difficult, single-target trials and dual-target trials were 
randomly presented rather than being presented in separate blocks, and thirdly, 
participants were asked to respond with yes/no to the question whether they saw a 
face rather than making an emotion decision. This time, disgusted faces were less 
often detected than happy faces overall but no social anxiety related effects were 
found. These findings suggest that social anxiety related differences in attention to 
emotional faces may depend upon the attentional set; being present when participants’ 
task causes them to scan the environment for emotional information but not present 
when emotion is not relevant to the task at hand. 
 Chapter 3: Attentional Blink Children. The experiment presented in chapter 3 
was an adaptation of chapter 2, experiment 2: animal T1 and face T2 with explicit 
emotion judgement. This time, child faces were used as stimuli, and participants were 
11-year-olds. The hypothesis that highly-anxious participants would have higher 
accuracy on disgusted face T2 if it closely followed a neutral T1, relative to happy 
face T2s and to low socially anxious participants, could not be fully accepted based 
on the findings. Instead, social anxiety appeared to be negatively correlated with 
accuracy for both emotions on dual-target trials, whilst this was not found for single-
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target trials. This suggests impaired cognitive control in anxiety, in which emotional 
processing was hindered by an increase in task complexity. 
 Chapter 4: Saccade curvature. This experiment was designed with two aims. 
Firstly, it was predicted that laterally presented task-irrelevant emotional face 
distractors would be processed as salient stimuli and would attract attention at early 
onset saccades, whereas attention would move away from them at late onset saccades. 
Secondly, it was investigated whether social anxiety-related differences in this pattern 
would emerge. Strong support for the first aim was found, indicating that emotional 
faces grab attention at early stages of processing in a bottom-up, or stimulus-driven 
way, whereas avoidance, presumably driven by top-down control, occurs during later 
stages of processing. As for the second aim, marginal effect sizes indicated that high-
anxious participants’ gaze deviated more toward emotional distractors than low-
anxious participants’ gaze, regardless of saccade onset time. On the other hand, the 
measure of angle suggested a different pattern for angry faces at fast saccade onsets: 
low-anxious participants looked toward the emotion as normal, whereas high-anxious 
participants looked away, which may indicate a fast-acting top down avoidance. 
Examination of initial average saccade direction showed that the initial deviations of 
low-anxious participants replicated their trajectories on the other measures for 
emotional faces: toward for fast saccade onsets and away for slow saccade onsets. In 
contrast, high-anxious participants always appeared to initiate their gaze toward the 
emotion regardless of onset time. In other words, for slow onset saccades, they would 
still initiate their gaze toward the emotion first, which would provide partial support 
for delayed disengagement.  
 Chapter 5: ssVEP. This experiment explored a technique that was recently 
developed in the field of face processing. Here, five facial identities with angry, 
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disgusted, fearful, happy, and neutral expressions were presented at a rate of 5.88Hz. 
Between tasks, participants were either asked to pay attention to changes in identity or 
to changes in emotion whilst their brain activity was recorded. The ssVEP response in 
occipital regions typically decreases over time, akin to neural adaptation. It was 
predicted that different emotional expressions would evoke different ssVEP 
amplitudes. Moreover, it was predicted that attentional set would play a role in social 
anxiety; thus differences in ssVEP amplitudes between high-anxious and low-anxious 
participants would be influenced by task type. Strong support was found for both 
hypotheses. Firstly, participants adapted most to angry faces and least to happy faces. 
This suggests that adaptation to threat stimuli occurs under a top-down mechanism, 
such as preparing the neurons for a potential fight-or-flight response. Secondly, a 
social anxiety by task interaction indicated that adaptation was reduced for high-
anxious participants when they were explicitly instructed to pay attention to changes 
in emotion, relative to both low-anxious participants and to themselves when 
instructed to pay attention to changes in identity. In other words, when task demands 
drove attention to emotion, the high-socially anxious participants had less neural 
adaptation showed a decreased reduction, which potentially indicates delayed 
disengagement from threat. 
 
 Discussion of results 
The findings highlighted above will be brought together across three central 
themes. The first two themes map onto the original aims of the thesis: 1) components 
of attentional bias in social anxiety with an emphasis on facilitated orienting, delayed 
disengagement, and avoidance; and 2) the novel techniques for assessing attentional 
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bias in social anxiety. The third theme developed as the thesis evolved and focuses on 
the potential importance of attentional set. 
 
6.2.1 Theme 1: Components of attention bias in social anxiety 
This thesis set out to explore the temporal aspects of attention bias for 
emotional faces in social anxiety. One influential account of the time course of 
attention bias in social anxiety is the hypervigilance-avoidance theory (e.g. Bögels 
and Mansell, 2004). Hypervigilance is often seen as a heightened state of arousal or 
alertness with attentional avoidance driven by top down strategies (Mogg et al., 
1997). Evidence for both mechanisms in anxiety has come from a large number of 
studies, from which it can be concluded that anxious individuals have a bias for 
preattentive detection of threat, as well as biases in later top down processes (Bar-
Haim et al., 2007). Most recently a three-component model of biases in anxiety has 
been proposed: facilitated attention toward threat, delayed disengagement away from 
threat, and attentional avoidance of threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Consequently, the 
first major theme presented in this work, was assessing which of these components 
might underpin biases in social anxiety. 
Facilitated attention toward threat. Facilitated attention refers to the relative 
speed or ease with which attention is oriented toward threatening information (Cisler 
& Koster, 2010). In other words, to explore whether facilitated attention plays a role 
in social anxiety-related attention bias, one could look into the findings of those 
experiments for which early processes were assessed. An example of this is 
experiment 2 (face-T2) in the series of attentional blink tasks (chapter 2). Facilitated 
attention toward threat would be demonstrated by differential performance between 
high-anxious and low-anxious participants when T2 closely followed T1, thus at lag-
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1. Here, high accuracy on both happy and disgusted faces was found for high-anxious 
participants, whereas low-anxious participants performed equally on disgusted faces, 
but worse on happy faces. Following this finding, it could be argued that there may 
not be facilitated attention toward threat per se in social anxiety, but rather toward 
emotional information more broadly. This is opposed to low-anxious participants, 
whose attention may be drawn to relevant/salient/threatening information such as 
disgusted faces, but less to ‘expected’ information like happy faces.  
Facilitated attention toward threat was investigated with this paradigm in a 
child sample too. Here, no evidence for facilitated attention toward threat in socially 
anxious children was found. In fact, a higher degree of social anxiety appeared to be 
related to poorer emotion recognition overall. It could be proposed that social anxiety 
in childhood is related to subtle deficits in emotion recognition. Through 
development, this lack of skills might drive attentional mechanisms to 
overcompensate, investing more resources in the processing of emotional input from 
the environment preferentially, which could plausibly lead to an attention bias toward 
emotional stimuli as seen in the adults in chapter 2. This idea cannot be further 
explored with the experiments offered here, but it could serve as a recommendation 
for future studies. 
Fast-onset saccades in the saccadic curvature experiment also provide insight 
into the component of facilitated attention toward threat. However, even though 
socially anxious participants’ gaze deviated toward emotional faces relative to neutral 
faces more than low-socially anxious participants, this effect occurred independently 
of onset time.  
In review, the evidence for social-anxiety related facilitated attention toward 
threat brought forward from these experiments is weak.  
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Delayed disengagement from threat. This component refers to the attentional 
captivity by threat stimuli and how that captivity impairs the switching of attention to 
something else (Cisler & Koster, 2010). Therefore, evidence from experiment 1 (face-
T1, neutral-T2) in the series of attentional blink tasks and differences in saccade 
onset-related trajectories in the eyetracking study will be discussed. (The ssVEP study 
was designed to investigate sustained attention toward threat rather than temporal 
components of bias like delayed disengagement). 
It could be argued that a prolonged attentional blink following a threatening 
face in social anxiety indicates delayed disengagement. However, no results of this 
nature were found. Those high in social anxiety had no more difficulties in switching 
attention from an emotional target to a neutral target than low-socially anxious 
participants. From this experiment, it cannot be concluded that difficulties with 
disengaging attention away from threat are manifested in social anxiety. 
The saccade curvature study could potentially highlight delayed 
disengagement as well. However, due to the uncertain sensitivity of the initial 
deviation (Ludwig & Gilchrist, 2002), this measure was only explored after-the-fact. 
Nevertheless, the findings are potentially revealing mechanisms of delayed 
disengagement. Overall, both anxiety groups deviated their curvature toward 
emotional faces on fast-onset saccades and away on slow-onset saccades. However, 
high-socially anxious participants always initiated their gaze to the emotional first. 
Seeing as this effect is also found on slow-onset saccades, delayed disengagement 
could be argued, as they take longer, relative to participants lower in social anxiety, to 
switch attention from the emotional information to typical emotion-processing 
patterns. 
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Taken together, these studies provide at best very modest support for the idea 
that attention bias in social anxiety is characterised by difficulties in attentional 
switching, or consequently, delayed disengagement. This matches the existing 
literature, which proposes that the link between anxiety and delayed disengagement is 
only present in certain contexts (Armstrong & Olatunji, 2012). 
Attentional avoidance. Attentional avoidance is not so much a temporal 
component, as it is used to refer to a preference to attend to stimuli in a spatial 
location away from the potential threat (Cisler & Koster, 2010; Koster et al., 2006). 
Thus, presenting two stimuli simultaneously would examine attentional avoidance, 
which is why the saccadic curvature experiment lent itself well for this. There was a 
general avoidance of emotional stimuli at slow-onset saccades for all participants. 
However, the measure of angle also indicated a fast-acting avoidance mechanism for 
high-socially anxious participants, whereas no avoidance for fast-onset saccades of 
low-anxious participants was found. Because fast-onset saccades are thought to be 
stimulus driven (Van Zoest & Donk, 2006), perhaps this attentional avoidance 
mechanism could not act fast enough to be replicated in the other measures. 
Nevertheless, there is some indication that attentional avoidance plays a role in social-
anxiety related attention bias. 
Theme 1 summary. The present experiments only found partial support for 
facilitated attention, delayed disengagement, and attentional avoidance for emotional 
faces in social anxiety. However, more research needs to be done in order to conclude 
whether attention bias for emotional faces in social anxiety underpinned facilitated 
orienting toward threat, delayed disengagement or difficulties with disengaging 
attention away from threat, and/or attentional avoidance of threat. Suggestions for 
future directions following the present findings will be discussed later in this chapter.  
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6.2.2 Theme 2: Methods 
The second theme revolves around the aim of exploring experimental 
techniques beyond the dot-probe which allow a closer investigation into attention bias 
in social anxiety. The lack of clear-cut findings from the experiments conducted 
within this thesis might easily mislead one to consider the tasks unsuitable for further 
study into attention bias. However, it is important to keep in mind that none of these 
experiments have been frequently used to explore attention bias in social anxiety. As 
such, there is much to learn from these experiments that can inform further 
investigation using these tasks. With this in mind, the following section will focus on 
what the methods offered as used here as well as methodological limitations and 
suggestions for future work to ensure that these methods are used to their full 
potential.  
By far the largest limitation of the attentional blink experiments was that the 
tasks were too easy. Especially in the child study, but also in experiments 1 and 2 in 
adults, there was a strong ceiling effect of performance. This was despite extensive 
piloting and adjustments to the paradigm. It is likely that this ceiling effect stems from 
human’s expertise for, and sensitivity to, faces (Kanwisher, 2000), as well as the 
tasks’ targets and distractors perhaps not being similar enough (Müsch et al., 2012). 
To achieve larger and more normally distributed variance in the data to analyse 
individual differences better, future attentional blink studies with faces should aim for 
more task difficulty, for example by backward-masking the targets. Experiment 3 of 
chapter 2, which chronologically took place after the child study, implemented these 
suggestions. Indeed, the data for experiment 3 met assumptions for analysis. A further 
consideration is that disgusted faces may be less threatening than angry faces, and are 
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therefore less successful for investigating threat bias. In conclusion, the attentional 
blink, with the right adjustments, has the benefit to potentially unlock the time course 
of attentional bias toward emotional faces in relation to facilitated attention as well as 
disengagement from threat in both children and adults but careful consideration must 
be given to task parameters to ensure an appropriate level of difficulty. 
The saccadic curvature paradigm has the potential to look at early stages of 
facilitated attention to threat, later processing stages of delayed disengagement, as 
well as top-down driven spatial avoidance. To unlock this potential, a few suggestions 
are proposed. Firstly, the degree with which distractor items capture attention should 
be increased. As noted in chapter 4, a previous study was conducted with smaller 
images which were more peripherally located. This study found no effects. It can 
therefore be argued, that bottom-up saliency could be improved further by increasing 
the image size and placing the images more centrally, closer to the vertical saccade 
trajectory. A second suggestion for future studies is procedural. Whilst this design 
was unique in that it looked at fast-onset versus slow-onset saccades for each 
participant individually, the cue, target, and distractors appeared simultaneously on 
every trial. By varying the stimulus onset asynchrony as in previous studies (e.g. 
Nummenmaa, Hyönä, & Calvo, 2009; McSorley & Van Reekum, 2013), saccades 
driven by task-characteristics could be analysed alongside individual onset-times. 
The ssVEP study was designed to investigate sustained attention toward threat 
under different task-demands (see theme 3). A benefit of the paradigm was that the 
evoked response emerged after brief stimulation, which makes this design powerful 
and efficient. Given how novel the method is, the results are insightful, but further 
improvements to the task could be made. One of the suggested adjustments would be 
implementing a different face condition. Currently, the stimulus changed after 30 
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flickers. Including a condition during which the face is changed at every flicker (see 
for example Gerlicher et al., 2013), would provide an individual baseline for each 
participant against which adaptation to repeated emotional stimuli could be measured. 
Furthermore, the current design used conditional randomisation of stimulus 
presentation order. The conditions were that relative to the presented stimulus, the 
subsequent stimulus had to be either the same identity, or express the same emotion. 
After stimulus presentation, it takes a few seconds for the ssVEP response to establish 
(Rossion, 2014; Rossion & Boremanse, 2011). For this reason, the first trial was 
omitted from the analysis. Due to the randomisation of order, there was no control 
over which stimulus was presented in the first trial, essentially leading to missing data 
for every participant. Future designs could include a neutral face at the beginning, 
which only serves for the ssVEP response to be evoked. With these minor adjustments 
to the approach the ssVEP offers a powerful and exciting tool for examining whether 
sustained attention toward threat is maintained in social anxiety, 
Reflecting on this second theme of methods, with a few adjustments as 
highlighted the methods used in this thesis could offer unique insights into how 
emotional face processing exactly is impaired or preferentially allocated in social 
anxiety and to contribute to the fields of individual differences and social cognition 
more broadly. 
  
6.2.3 Theme 3: Attentional set 
Whereas themes 1 and 2 were driven by the aims of this thesis, theme 3 
follows from reflection of the overall patterns found in the data. To summarise: task 
demands matter. That is to say, in this thesis overall, effects of social anxiety were 
only found when emotion was task-relevant.  
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For example, in the attentional blink task with explicit emotion judgement  
(face-T2; chapter 2, experiment 2), low socially anxious participants were not as 
accurate for happy faces as they were for disgusted faces, whereas high socially 
anxious participants processed both happy and disgusted faces accurately. However, 
in the implicit task (experiment 3) social anxiety related differences did not emerge. 
Furthermore, in the child sample (explicit emotion task) social anxiety related 
differences were found as well, this time as a main effect. In contrast, in the eye-
tracking study (chapter 4) there was some evidence of social anxiety related 
attentional avoidance and perhaps delayed disengagement, as described above, but 
these findings were subtle at most. Finally, a social anxiety related effect emerged in 
the ssVEP study (chapter 5) which was designed with this task-relevance in mind. 
Again, social anxiety related differences were only found when emotion was task 
relevant. It would appear therefore that attentional biases may only surface when 
participants have a specific attentional set which promotes scanning of the 
environment for emotion.  
The idea that task demands may affect attentional biases is consistent with an 
emerging body of research demonstrating that task relevance is important for 
performance of emotional-attention tasks. For example, Stein et al. (2009) found a 
stronger attentional blink for fearful than for neutral faces when the emotion was task-
relevant, but not when the emotion was task-irrelevant., It has recently been suggested 
that inconsistencies in the literature regarding anxiety-related attention bias might 
exist, at least in part, because of differences in the task-relevance of emotional stimuli 
(Dodd, Vogt, Turkileri, & Notebaert, 2016).  
A recent theory (Richards, Benson, Donnelly, & Hadwin, 2014) provided one 
explanation for how task-relevance might affect attention. For biases that occur during 
  
 
121 
early stages of attentional processing, the terms hypervigilance and facilitated 
orienting might be confusing. These terms are often used interchangeably (e.g. Bar-
Ham et al., 2007). However, Richards et al. (2014) proposed that early attentive biases 
can be divided into two distinct components that are unlikely to occur simultaneously: 
1) hypervigilance and 2) selective attention. The review paper by Richards and 
colleagues provides models of each mechanism under which the facilitated attention 
component discussed in this thesis acts differently. Under hypervigilance, which is 
related to alertness for threat signals and scanning of the environment, facilitated 
attention leads to enhanced threat detection. When attention is narrowed onto threat 
under selective attention however, facilitated attention is responsible for rapid 
engagement with threat rather than enhanced detection. Outcomes of impaired 
attention are also different under hypervigilance than under selective attention. Under 
selective attention, when threat is present but task irrelevant, impaired attention can be 
reflected by attentional capture by threat or delayed disengagement from threat. 
However, under hypervigilance, when threat could be task relevant too, but also 
absent, impaired attention is reflected in difficulties focusing attention on the task. It 
is interesting to explore the results of the current experiments with these models in 
mind and have a closer look at task-relevance of threat. 
In the saccade curvature task, threat was present but a) task-irrelevant, and b) 
not in a task-relevant location. Social anxiety related biases therefore would have 
emerged under conditions of hypervigilance, where the environment is excessively 
scanned. Under hypervigilance, impaired attention is highlighted by difficulties 
focusing on the task altogether and not necessarily by attentional capture by threat or 
delayed disengagement, which could explain why no strong evidence for either was 
found. From the ssVEP task, designed with task demands in mind, it could be derived 
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that facilitated attention under selective attention may not only result in faster and 
better performance on eye-tracking tasks as proposed by Richards et al. (2014), but 
also to reduced neural adaptation, and therewith sustained emotional attention. 
However, a number of findings from this thesis do not align particularly well 
with the predictions of the Richards et al. (2014) model. When threat was task 
relevant in the attentional blink task (chapter 2, experiment 2), the model would 
predict that impaired attention would be reflected in threat capture, but the high 
socially anxious participants did not show a preferential capture of disgusted faces. 
Similarly, when threat was present but task-irrelevant in the attentional blink (chapter 
2, experiment 3), the model would predict social anxiety should affect tasks 
performance, but there was no social anxiety related general performance deficit.  
Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the studies in this thesis were not 
designed to address the effects of task relevance per se and this was not one of the 
original aims of the thesis. However, the overall pattern of results presented here 
together with the recent progress in theory and research discussed suggests that is a 
promising area for future research which may help to reconcile seemingly inconsistent 
findings in the field. 
Theme 3 conclusion. In hindsight, the overall pattern of results reported in 
this thesis could potentially be explained by the varying task-demands affecting top 
down mechanisms of attention. Overall, stronger anxiety-related effects were found if 
participants’ attention was directed toward the emotion by task-demands. Fewer 
convincing anxiety related effects were found when emotion, or threat specifically, 
was task irrelevant. Different task demands and characteristics could evoke different 
attentional sets, such as alertness in hypervigilance or preferential processing in 
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selective attention. It is proposed that future studies should investigate under which 
conditions attention bias in social anxiety are present. 
 
6.2.4 Clinical implications 
Attention bias research has led to the development of Attention Bias 
Modification (ABM) training (Bar-Haim, 2010). A common task used in ABM is a 
modified dot-probe task, in which the probe is, for example, relatively more often 
presented under the non-threat than the threat-stimulus, to train attentional avoidance 
of threat (Bar-Haim, 2010; MacLeod & Clarke, 2015). There is some promising 
evidence that ABM can reduce threat bias in anxiety even after a single session, but 
the findings are not consistent. Specifically regarding social anxiety, a systematic 
review identified that ABM had only small effects on social anxiety symptoms and 
attention bias, that these effect sizes were moderated by factors such as study design 
and trait anxiety, and that ABM had no long-lasting effects (Heeren, Mogoașe, 
Philippot, & McNally, 2015).  
To improve ABM, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the specific 
attentional processes that are impaired in anxiety (Kuckertz & Amir, 2015). For 
example, if a clear social anxiety-related pattern of attentional avoidance of threat had 
been found in the saccadic curvature experiment (chapter 3) this would suggest that 
ABM should focus on decreasing attentional avoidance of threat. A recently proposed 
framework of the link between ABM and cognitive mechanisms such as initial 
orienting and threat avoidance further confirmed this suggestion (Mogg & Bradley, 
2016). 
Clarifying the nature of attentional biases in social anxiety was one of the aims 
of the work presented here. However, given that the findings are not clear-cut, it 
  
 
124 
would be premature to make recommendations for changes to current interventions. 
Instead, the findings highlight the complexity of attentional biases in social anxiety 
and the relatively subtle nature of these biases, which may be found only under 
specific task conditions. Further research continuing to use novel and imaginative 
approaches is required to really fine-tune our understanding of attentional biases in 
social anxiety. It is hoped that the work and recommendations presented here provide 
a small step towards achieving that.  
 
6.2.5 Limitations and directions 
In the discussion of themes above, limitations relative to the experimental 
techniques used were highlighted and discussed, but a few general limitations remain. 
• It must be acknowledged that sample sizes for each study were 
relatively small: N = 30 – 39. Moreover, due to the classification of 
low- and high-socially anxious groups based on suggested cut-off 
scores, group sizes were as small as n = 12. Consequently, whereas a 
lack of group effects or interactions with other variables has been 
reported as evident null-results, it is possible that the studies were 
underpowered and effects were not detected because of type-II errors. 
• There was a reliance on student samples and questionnaire measures of 
social anxiety. The experiments offered here can potentially be 
extended to work with clinical participants. However, given the 
relative complexity of working with a clinical sample, it is important 
that task parameters are fine-tuned to ensure a robust design first. The 
work presented here represents a step toward this but further work in 
non-clinical populations to extend and replicate the current tasks 
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before extending these methods to research with clinical samples is 
recommended.  
• The poorer emotion recognition in high socially anxious children 
relative to low socially anxious children was not found in the adult 
population. This may suggest that this subtle deficit plants a seed for 
attention bias in adulthood, but the cross-sectional design cannot rule 
out that this difference arose from certain confounds, such as variations 
between the tasks or testing environments. Longitudinal studies 
tracking the development of attention and emotion recognition skills in 
socially anxious children and adults is required to examine the 
hypothesis that early emotion recognition difficulties affect anxiety and 
attention bias later in life. 
• Perhaps more definitive conclusions for the thesis overall would have 
been reached had the thesis had been focused on a single task as the 
task design and parameters could have been tweaked following the 
results of each study. Instead, a range of novel approaches to studying 
attention bias in social anxiety are introduced. Recommendations 
regarding how each of these could be improved upon and utilised in 
future work have been provided under theme 2.  
 
 Conclusion 
This thesis aimed to provide a theoretical and experimental expansion of what 
is known about attentional biases in social anxiety using a mixed-method approach 
across a series of studies. Taken together, despite the methodological challenges that 
need to be overcome to investigate the exact underpinning mechanisms further 
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(chapters 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6), this thesis reveals some evidence for social anxiety 
related hypervigilance toward threat, delayed disengagement from threat and 
attentional avoidance of threat. Nevertheless, the results were not clear-cut (chapters 
1, 2, 3, 4, 5, and 6), but it was found that social anxiety in children may be associated 
with subtle deficits in emotion recognition (chapter 2). Facilitated attention toward 
social information in social anxiety depends on whether the emotional information is 
task-relevant (chapters 2, 4, 5 and 6), whereas avoidance of threat in social anxiety 
might be driven by top-down mechanisms such as cognitive control or attentional set 
(chapters 3 and 4).  
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Appendix A  
Social Phobia Inventory (SPIN; Connor et al., 2000). 
 
Social	Phobia	Inventory	(SPIN)	
Participant	Number:		 	 	 	 Date:		
	
Please	read	each	statement	and	select	a	number;	1,2,3,4	or	5	which	
indicates	how	much	the	statement	applied	to	you	over	the	past	week.	
There	are	no	right	or	wrong	answers.	Do	not	spend	too	much	time	on	
any	one	statement.	This	assessment	is	not	intended	to	be	a	diagnosis.	If	
you	are	concerned	about	your	results	in	any	way,	please	speak	with	a	
qualified	health	professional.		
1 = Not at all   2 = A little bit   3 = Somewhat    4 = Very much     5 = Extremely 
1	 I	am	afraid	of	people	in	authority	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
2	 I	am	bothered	by	blushing	in	
front	of	people	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
3	 Parties	and	social	events	scare	
me	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
4	 I	avoid	talking	to	people	I	don’t	
know	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
5	 Being	criticised	scares	me	a	lot	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
6	 I	avoid	doing	things	or	speaking	
to	people	for	fear	of	
embarrassment		
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
7	 Sweating	in	front	of	people	
causes	me	distress	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
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8	 I	avoid	going	to	parties	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
9	 I	avoid	activities	in	which	I	am	
the	centre	of	attention	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
10	 Talking	to	strangers	scares	me	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
11	 I	avoid	having	to	give	speeches	 1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
12	 I’d	do	anything	to	avoid	being	
criticised	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
13	 Heart	palpitations	bother	me	
when	I	am	around	people	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
14	 I	am	afraid	of	doing	things	when	
people	might	be	watching	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
15	 Being	embarrassed	or	looking	
stupid	are	among	my	worst	fears	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
16	 I	avoid	speaking	to	anyone	in	
authority	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
17	 Trembling	or	shaking	in	front	of	
others	is	distressing	to	me	
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	
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Appendix B 
Brief Fear of Negative Evaluation, Straightforwardly worded (BFNE-S; Collins et al., 
2005; Rodebaugh et al, 2011). 
 
BFNE-S 
 
ID:          Date: 
 
Please read each statement carefully and indicate how characteristic it is of 
you according to the following scale: 
1 = Not at all characteristic of me 
2 = Slightly characteristic of me 
3 = Moderately characteristic of me 
4 = Very characteristic of me 
5 = Extremely characteristic of me 
 
1 I worry about what other people will think of 
me even when I know it doesn’t make any 
difference 
1 2 3 4 5 
2 I am frequently afraid of other people 
noticing my shortcomings 1 2 3 4 5 
3 I am afraid that others will not approve of me 
 1 2 3 4 5 
4 
I am afraid that people will find fault with me 1 2 3 4 5 
5 When I am talking to someone, I worry about 
what they may be thinking about me 1 2 3 4 5 
6 I am usually worried about what kind of 
impression I make 1 2 3 4 5 
7 Sometimes I think I am too concerned with 
what other people think of me 1 2 3 4 5 
8 I often worry that I will say or do the wrong 
thing 1 2 3 4 5 
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Appendix C 
Social Anxiety Scale for Children-Revised (SASC-R; La Greca & Stone, 1993). 
 
This is not a test, there are no right or wrong answers. Please answer each a honestly 
as you can. 
 
Use these numbers to show HOW MUCH YOU FEEL something is true for you: 
 
1 = Not at all 
2 = Hardly ever 
3 = Sometimes 
4 = Most of the time 
5 = All the time 
 
Now let’s try these sentences first. How much does each describe how you feel? 
a. I like summer vacation…. 1  2  3  4  5 
b. I like to eat spinach…. 1  2  3  4  5 
 
1.  I worry about doing something new in front of other kids……... 1   2   3   4   5  
2.  I like to play with other kids……………………………………. 1   2   3   4   5 
3.  I worry about being teased……………………………………… 1   2   3   4   5 
4.  I feel shy around kids I don’t know…………………………….. 1   2   3   4   5 
5.  I only talk to kids that I know really well………………………. 1   2   3   4   5 
6.  I feel that other kids talk about me behind my back……………. 1   2   3   4   5 
7.  I like to read…………………………………………………….. 1   2   3   4   5 
8.  I worry about what other kids think of me.................................... 1   2   3   4   5 
9.  I’m afraid that others will not like me………………………….. 1   2   3   4   5 
10.  I get nervous when I talk to kids I don’t know really well……. 1   2   3   4   5 
11.  I like to play sports…………………………………………….. 1   2   3   4   5 
12.  I worry about what others say about me………………………. 1   2   3   4   5 
13.  I get nervous when I meet new kids…………………………… 1   2   3   4   5 
14.  I worry that other kids don’t like me………………………….. 1   2   3   4   5 
15.  I’m quiet when I’m with a group of kids ……………………... 1   2   3   4   5 
16.  I like to do things by myself....................................................... 1   2   3   4   5 
17.  I feel that other kids make fun of me.......................................... 1   2   3   4   5 
18.  If I get into an argument with another kid, I worry that he or  
she will not like me................................................................ 1   2   3   4   5 
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19.  I’m afraid to invite other kids to do things with me because  
they might say no................................................................... 1   2   3   4   5 
20.  I feel nervous when I’m around certain kids.............................. 1   2   3   4   5 
21.  I feel shy even with kids I know well......................................... 1   2   3   4   5 
22.  It’s hard for me to ask other kids to do things with me.............. 1   2   3   4   5 
 
